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AN EXAMINATION OF UNITED STATES NAVY LEASING: 






This project analyzes the Navy’s 1982 decision to lease thirteen T-AKX class 
Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) and five Champion Class T-5 replacement tankers.  
It examines the MPS/T-5 history, a brief history of Navy ship leasing, and the MPS/T-5 
acquisition process.  In addition, it reviews the laws and regulations that were in place at 
the time of the lease and the cost comparison between the lease versus purchase decision. 
The examination concludes that while leasing the MPS/T-5 ships was more cost 
effective under 1982 laws and assumptions, many of these assumptions would no longer 
be used under current laws and regulations.  Thus, from a purely monetary point of view, 
leasing would no longer be more cost effective than purchasing.  However, leasing does 
provide three significant advantages that are not present in a traditional procurement. 
First, leasing allows the Government to pay as it uses an asset, which spreads the 
payments over an asset’s useful life rather than completely paying for the asset when 
procured.  Second, leasing allows the Government to bypass a lengthy procurement 
process, resulting in earlier asset utilization.  Third, leasing allows the Government to 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1936 Congress passed the Merchant Marine Act, which states:  
It is necessary for the national defense and development of its foreign and 
domestic commerce that the United States shall have a merchant marine 
(a) sufficient to carry its domestic water-borne commerce . . ., (b) capable 
of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or national 
emergency . . ., (d) composed of the best-equipped, safest, and most 
suitable types of vessels . . ., and (e) supplemented by efficient facilities 
for shipbuilding and ship repair.1 
While the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 does not spell out in detail how to fulfill 
these requirements, the fuel tanker program and the Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) 
program, both run by Military Sealift Command (MSC), are examples that fulfill these 
requirements.  In addition, MSC’s mission “to provide ocean transportation of equipment, 
fuel, supplies and ammunition to sustain US forces worldwide during peacetime and in 
war. . .”2 also supports the mission-essential need for fuel tankers and prepositioned 
ships. 
Thus, in the early 1980s the Navy needed several MPS and fuel tanker ships.  The 
requirement for MPS vessels was driven largely by the MPS (a.k.a. TAKX) Program, 
which had been authorized by the Secretary of Defense in August 1979.  The purpose of 
this Program was to increase the US military’s rapid response capability to crisis 
situations by pre-staging equipment and supplies on ships positioned strategically around 
the world. 
The actual requirement for the MPS Program was sufficient ship capacity for 
equipment and supplies to sustain three Marine Expeditionary Brigades ashore for 30 
days of combat.  This need resulted in Naval Sea Systems Command’s (NAVSEA) 
October 14, 1981, Request for Proposal (RFP) Number N00024-82-R-2051: TAKX 
                                                 
1 United States Code. “Title 46, Appendix—Shipping, Chapter 27--Merchant Marine Act, 1936, 
Subchapter I--Declaration Of Policy.” http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/title46a/46a_21_1_.html 
(accessed 3 November 2004). 
2 Military Sealift Command. “MSC Overview: Mission.” 
http://www.msc.navy.mil/N00P/overview.asp?page=mission (accessed 3 November 2004). 
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Maritime Prepositioning Ships.  This RFP sought either a lease3 or purchase of what 
would later become 13 maritime prepositioning ships. 
 At the same time, the Navy faced an aging fleet of T-5 fuel tankers, many of 
which were World War II (WWII)-vintage.  Fuel tankers were required by the Navy to 
transport fuel to vital locations around the world for use during peacetime and times of 
conflict.  During WWII, the Navy leased a variety of tanker ships to meet its fuel 
transportation requirements and, following the war, maintained and operated numerous4 
tankers. 
In June 1972, the Navy entered into a lease agreement for the charter of nine T-2 
replacement tankers to replace 14 WWII-vintage T-2 tankers.  The T-2 tankers were 
originally planned to be built with appropriated funds; however, when acquisition proved 
infeasible due to budgetary constraints, the Department of Defense (DoD) opted to enter 
into a long-term lease.5  Thus, the requirement to replace five of the WWII-vintage T-5 
tankers was expected, and on January 11, 1982, Military Sealift Command (MSC) issued 
RFP Number N00033-82-R-7002 for the charter of five T-5 replacement tankers. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
While many questions could be answered in this project, our research focuses on 
three main areas: the reasoning behind the MPS/T-5 lease agreements6, the factors 
involved in the Deal and the lessons learned from the MPS/T-5 experience.  These issues 
will be addressed by answering the following questions: 
1) Why did the Navy decide to lease versus purchase (LvP) the 18 MPS/T-5 
vessels? 
2) How was the Deal structured? 
                                                 
3 The terms ‘lease’ and ‘charter’ are synonymous and are used interchangeably. 
4 As of September 30, 2003, 27 tankers were under the control of either MSC or the MARAD 
(Maritime Administration).  See Figure 1. 
5 Mary Ann Peters, “Is Leasing By The Federal Government A Good Thing For The American 
Taxpayer?”  (Ph. D. diss., Golden Gate University, 1979), 37. 
6 The 13 MPS and five T-5 vessels that make up the 1982 MPS/T-5 lease agreements will be referred 
to as the “Deal” throughout the remainder of this paper. 
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3) Was leasing more cost effective than purchasing? 
4) What special legislation and special administrative provisions were necessary 
to obtain Congressional approval of the Deal? 
5) What was Argent Group Ltd.’s role? 
6) What legislation, tax, and regulatory changes have occurred since 1984, which 
would impact the perceived attractiveness of the Deal today? 
7) What conclusions have been derived with regard to the feasibility of a LvP 
decision in a 2004 environment? 
B. RESEARCH METHODS 
Argent Group Ltd. (AGL) provided the majority of the information used for this 
project.  Data were collected from AGL’s historical files.  These files consisted of 
Congressional reports; internal and external AGL-drafted documents; various media 
documentation, such as newspaper, journal and magazine articles; and personal 
correspondence between AGL, MSC contractors, banking institutions, and Congress. 
To develop the background of the MPS/T-5 experience, basic interviews were 
conducted with AGL’s managing directors, the MSC MPS Project Officer, MSC’s 
Executive Assistant for Business Operations, and senior military members who were 
involved in the Deal’s original negotiations and contract awards.  The interviews added to 
the overall understanding of the MPS/T-5 experience and the information obtained from 
them has been verified by the aforementioned documentation. 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-11 and A-94 for 1980 and 
2004 provided information regarding leasing rules and regulations.  The purpose of using 
the 1980 and 2004 editions of the OMB circular A-11 and A-94 was to compare and 
contrast leasing changes since the Deal’s inception. 
Technical specifics of the 18 ships were retrieved from interviews with MSC, the 
MSC website, the original MPS/T-5 RFPs and various technical manuals. 
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C. ORGANIZATION OF THE REMAINING CHAPTERS 
The history of the MPS/T-5 tankers will be examined in Chapter II, including the 
ship’s key historical events, as well as a complete chronology of events from the time the 
MPS/T-5 vessels were authorized until present.  In addition, AGL, a specialized 
investment-banking firm hired by the Navy to be its financial advisor, and its 
involvement in the Deal will be discussed. 
Chapter III will provide a comprehensive evaluation of the Deal and an extensive 
discussion of the Deal’s structure and key players.  We will examine the cost 
effectiveness of leasing compared to procurement, and discuss special legislation that 
would be necessary to ensure viability of future ship leasing projects.  Ship operation will 
also be discussed, and the capital hire component of the leases will be reviewed in detail.  
Finally, the Navy’s decision to purchase four of the five T-5 tankers in January 2003, 
several years before the expiration of their leases, will be evaluated. 
In Chapter IV, we will present a survey of the legislative, tax, and regulatory 
issues and discuss its impact on the Deal and future leasing feasibility.  Specifically, we 
will discuss what governing changes originated from the decision to lease the MPS/T-5 
vessels.  We will discuss, in retrospect, the geopolitical and financial successes of the 
past twenty years that were influenced by the operational capability of the ships acquired 
in the Deal. 
In Chapter V, we will present leasing recommendations—specifically, when the 
Government should lease and when it should purchase, and the required legislation that 
would make leasing more viable in 2005.  We will also offer a net total cost to the 
Government (NTCG) tax implication analysis based on AGL, the Joint Committee on 
Taxation, and our own analyses.  Finally, we will conclude our study with a project 
summary and provide direction for future research. 
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II. HISTORY OF THE MARITIME PREPOSITIONING SHIPS 
AND T-5 TANKERS 
A. MARITIME PREPOSITIONING SHIPS AND T-5 TANKERS 
 During the Cold War era of the 1980s the US was still highly involved in a 
massive armed forces build-up.  Part of this increase was President Ronald Reagan’s 
concept of a “600-ship Navy”7: a Navy effort to regain its post-Vietnam-era size to deal 
with the Soviet threat.  As a result of this effort, additional money was spent on the 
procurement of high-priority combat ships, which included the MPS/T-5 Program. 
 After the MPS/T-5 RFP solicitation, AGL, the Navy’s financial advisor, 
recommended that the Navy divide the RFP into different sections due to the proposals’ 
magnitude and complexity.  It was during the RFP analysis that the decision to charter the 
ships was deemed the best option.  Under 1982 laws and regulations, the cost of leasing 
the MPS/T-5 vessels was determined to be lower than the cost of purchasing them.  
Furthermore, Congress authorized the procurement of the ships even though the money 
had not yet been appropriated.  Because the payments were spread over the ship’s life, 
current fiscal year procurement money could be used on high-priority combat ships. 
B. CHRONOLOGICAL EVENTS: 1979 – PRESENT 
A MPS/T-5 chronology of events from conception to present day follows.  This 
chronology is purposely abbreviated to provide the reader a brief overview.  A detailed 
analysis of some of these events will be forthcoming in Chapter III. 
 
• 1979 August – Secretary of Defense authorized the Maritime 
Prepositioning Ship (a.k.a. TAKX) Program, which was specifically intended to increase 
the US’s ability to rapidly respond to crisis situations using a credible force. 
 
                                                 
7 Webster’s Dictionary Online. “600-ship Navy.” http://www.webster-dictionary.org/definition/600-
ship+Navy (accessed October 14, 2004). 
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• 1980 September – Congress authorized the TAKX ships. 
 
• 1981 October – NAVSEA issued RFP Number N00024-82-R-2051, 
requesting proposals to either charter or purchase 12 to 15 TAKX Maritime 
Prepositioning Ships. 
 
• 1981 December – Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Secretary of 
the Navy (SECNAV) approved the use of a charter rather than a purchase. 
 
• 1982 January – MSC issued RFP Number N00033-82-R-7002, requesting 
proposals to charter five T-5 replacement tankers. 
 
• 1982 January – Technical offers received from ten offerors under the 
TAKX RFP. 
 
• 1982 March – TAKX RFP price proposals received by NAVSEA. 
 
• 1982 May – Initial offers received from nine offerors under the T-5 tanker 
RFP. 
 
• 1982 August – Conditional TAKX awards made to Maersk (3 ships firm + 
2 option), Waterman (1 ship firm + 2 option), General Dynamics (2 ships firm + 3 
option). 
 
• 1982 September – Congressional oversight committees approved TAKX 
awards. 
 
• 1982 September – Conditional award made to Ocean Carriers (a.k.a. 
Shipholdings) (2 tankers firm + 3 option). 
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• 1982 October – Option exercised for 2nd Waterman TAKX. 
 
• 1983 January – Options exercised for 4th and 5th Maersk, 3rd - 5th General 
Dynamics, and 3rd Waterman TAKX. 
 
• 1983 April – Options exercised for 3rd - 5th T-5 tankers. 
 
• 1984 September – Maersk # 1 TAKX ship delivered: CPL Louis Hauge, 
Jr. 
• 1984 October – Waterman # 1 TAKX ship delivered: SGT Matej Kocak. 
 
• 1984 October – Maersk # 2 TAKX ship delivered: PFC William B. Baugh. 
 
• 1985 January – Waterman # 2 TAKX ship delivered: PFC Eugene A. 
Obregon. 
 
• 1985 February – General Dynamics # 1 TAKX ship delivered: 2nd LT 
John P. Bobo. 
 
• 1985 March – Maersk # 3 TAKX ship delivered: PFC James Anderson, Jr. 
 
• 1985 May – Waterman # 3 TAKX ship delivered: Major Stephen W. 
Pless. 
 
• 1985 June – Shipholdings # 1 T-5 tanker delivered: Paul Buck. 
 
• 1985 June – General Dynamics # 2 TAKX ship delivered: PFC Dewayne 
T. Williams. 
 
• 1985 September – Shipholdings # 2 T-5 tanker delivered: Gus W. Darnell. 
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• 1985 September – Maersk # 5 TAKX ship delivered: PVT Harry Fisher, 
later renamed the PVT Franklin J. Philips. 
 
• 1985 September – Maersk # 4 TAKX ship delivered: 1st LT Alex 
Bonnyman. 
 
• 1985 November – Shipholding # 3 T-5 tanker delivered: Samuel L. Cobb. 
 
• 1985 November – General Dynamics # 3 TAKX ship delivered: 1st LT 
Bloomer Lopez. 
 
• 1986 February – Shipholding # 4 T-5 tanker delivered: Richard G. 
Matthiesen. 
 
• 1986 March – General Dynamics # 4 TAKX ship delivered: 1st LT Jack 
Hummus. 
 
• 1986 April – Shipholding # 5 T-5 tanker delivered: Lawrence H. Gianella. 
 
• 1986 May – General Dynamics # 5 TAKX ship delivered: SGT William 
R. Button. 
 
• 2003 January – MSC exercised option to buy Shipholdings # 1 T-5 tanker, 
Paul Buck, 28 months before lease option expired. 
 
• 2003 January – MSC exercised option to buy Shipholding # 3 T-5 tanker, 
Samuel L. Cobb, 33 months before lease option expired. 
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• 2003 January – MSC exercised option to buy Shipholding # 4 T-5 tanker, 
Richard G. Matthiesen, 36 months before lease option expired. 
 
• 2003 January – Military Sealift Command exercised option to buy 
Shipholding # 5 T-5 tanker, Lawrence H. Gianella, 38 months before lease option 
expired. 
 
• 2003 January – Military Sealift Command unable to negotiate an equitable 
price for Shipholdings # 2 T-5 tanker, Gus W. Darnell. 
 
• 2005 August – Lease option scheduled to expire on Shipholdings # 2 T-5 
tanker, Gus W. Darnell. 
C. OPERATIONAL HISTORY  
1. 1982 MPS/T-5 Tanker Lease Versus Purchase Option 
 The decision of whether it was more advantageous for the Navy to lease rather 
than purchase the 18 ships in the MPS/T-5 tanker deal in 1982 can be viewed from many 
angles.  One angle focuses on whether the ship’s operating cost under a lease agreement 
was a greater economic advantage to the Government over an outright vessel purchase 
and operation.   
 To present a complete analysis of whether the decision to lease the vessels was an 
appropriate one, it is necessary to understand the ship’s history and purpose within a 
MSC operational context. 
2. Military Sealift Command 
 MSC’s mission is to provide ocean transportation for the DoD, and it is 
specifically responsible for providing strategic sealift and ocean transportation for all 
military forces overseas.  
 MSC is under the command of the United States Navy and makes up one of the 
three component commands of the United States Transportation Command 
(TRANSCOM).  The other two component commands of TRANSCOM are the Air 
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Mobility Command (AMC), commanded by the United States Air Force, and the Defense 
Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), commanded by the 
United States Army.  
 MSC is headquartered at the Washington Navy Yard in Washington, D.C., and 
has five Area Commands around the world: Sealift Logistics Command Atlantic, MSC 
Central, MSC Europe, MSC Far East, and MSC Pacific.  MSC operates through four 
programs to conduct its mission: 1) Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF), 2) Special 
Mission, 3) Prepositioning, and 4) Sealift.8  
 The NFAF acts as the Navy’s lifeline-at-sea.  It performs at-sea replenishment 
operations with Navy ships, and some NFAF ships conduct towing and salvage 
operations and act as floating medical facilities.  The Special Mission ships carry out 
diverse assignments for DoD sponsors and perform such duties as oceanographic surveys, 
submarine support, missile test ships, undersea cable laying and high-speed 
transportation.  The Prepositioning Program provides vessels to forward staging areas 
throughout the world to support DoD combat operations in a relatively rapid response 
mode.  The Sealift Program is designed to meet all DoD sealift requirements in times of 
peace and war.  The Sealift Program itself is composed of three operations: Tankers, Dry-
Cargo, and Surge Sealift.  Several Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships are under the 
cognizance of the Maritime Administration, a component of the Department of 
Transportation, but which may come under MSC control in times of war or other 
contingencies.  These RRF ships may be used, as applicable, in any of the four MSC 
programs.  
 The 18 vessels acquired by MSC in the Deal are used to support the 
Prepositioning Program and the Tanker arm of the Sealift Program. 
 
                                                 
8 Military Sealift Command. 2003 in Review. Organization & Strength. 
http://www.msc.navy.mil/annualreport/2003/organization.htm (accessed 21 September 2004). 
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Figure 1. MSC-Controlled Ships9 
 
Figure 1 depicts the MSC-controlled fleet as of September 30, 2003.  The 13 MPS 
vessels are depicted in the lower portion of the “Prepositioning” column, and the five T-5 
Champion-class tankers are depicted in the upper portion of the ‘Sealift’ column.  As of 
September 30, 2003, the Government purchased four of the five tankers.  The remaining 
ship, MV Gus Darnell (T-AOT 1121), still operates under its long-term charter, which 
expires August 2005.  
3. Prepositioning Program 
 The Prepositioning Program consists of cargo ships forward deployed throughout 
the world.  It is comprised of the Combat Preposition Force (CPF), which carries 
                                                 
9 Military Sealift Command. 2003 in Review. Financial & Statistical Review. 
http://www.msc.navy.mil/annualreport/2003/financial.htm (accessed 1 October 2004). 
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equipment for Army operations; the Maritime Preposition Force (MPF), which carries 
equipment for United States Marine Corps (USMC) operations; and the Logistics 
Preposition Force (LPF), which carries equipment for the Navy, Air Force, and Defense 
Logistics Agency (DLA).  The 13 containerized and roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships 
acquired in the Deal agreement are used by the MPF. 
 The MPF ships are located throughout the world in three geographically strategic 
areas as depicted in Figure 2.  The MPF is made up of three Maritime Preposition 
Squadrons (MPSRON).  MPSRON-1 is located in the Mediterranean Sea, MPSRON-2 in 




Figure 2. Maritime Preposition Squadron’s Strategic Homeports10 
 
The importance of MPSRON positioning can be seen in Table 1, which depicts the 
estimated transit times from MPSRON homeports to some of the world’s potential crisis 
areas.  
 
                                                 
10 Headquarters Marine Corps, “National Strategic Asset, Blount Island, FL – The case for DoD 
Acquisition – May 2003” 
http://www.hqmc.usmc.mil/ilweb.nsf/o/1d821ba07d692a07852569d20040d9b6/$FILE/Blount+ 
Island.pdf (accessed 16 October 2004). 
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Table 1. MPSRON Transit Times11 
 
MARITIME PREPOSITION SQUADRON (MPSRON) 
TRANSIT TIMES 
LOCATION MPS-1 MPS-2 MPS-3 
Persian Gulf 11 Days 1-7 Days 16 Days 
Korean Peninsula 21 Days 13 Days 4 Days 
Mediterranean Sea 2 Days 13 Days 22 Days 
 
 
Of the 16 ships in the MPF, 13 were acquired in the Deal.  These ships are listed in 
Appendix A, along with the squadron to which they are currently assigned. 
 As previously mentioned, the ships of the MPF are designed to support USMC 
operations.  Normally, the ships will rest at anchor along with other ships in the squadron 
at the squadron’s homeport.  They are required to conduct exercises annually, where all 
ships in the squadron get underway and sail in the vicinity of their homeport for two to 
four weeks.  In addition to the required sortie exercise, they may also participate in other 
regional exercises in support of USMC operations.  One such annual exercise is Exercise 
Cobra Gold, which the US conducts with the Thai military.  Figure 3 depicts the MV 1st 
Lt. Baldomero Lopez (of MPSRON-2) off-loading USMC equipment via onboard cranes 
during Exercise Cobra Gold 2002. 
 
                                                 
11 Webbers, Rudolf (MAJ), Headquarters Marine Corps Prepositioning Handbook. 2004, 30. 
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Figure 3. MV 1st Lt. Baldomero12 
  
 The MPS vessels excel in their offload capabilities, especially in the use of ramps 
to deliver vehicles under their RO/RO capacity.  Figure 4 shows a picture of the SS PFC 
Eugene A. Obregon (of MPSRON-1) delivering vehicles to USMC forces in 
Thessalonika, Greece, during Exercise Dynamic Mix 2000, a military exercise held with 
Greek forces.  
 
Figure 4. SS PFC Eugene A. Obregon (T-AK 3006)13 
                                                 
12 Military Sealift Command. 2002 in Review. Exercise Participation. 
http://www.msc.navy.mil/annualreport/2002/pmfpb.htm (accessed 21 September 2004). 
13 Military Sealift Command. 2000 in Review. Exercise Participation. 
http://www.msc.navy.mil/annualreport/2000/exercise.htm (accessed 21 September 2004). 
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 Aside from normal operations and annual exercises, MPS vessels have proven 
their worth to US national defense over the last 20 years, and they continue to do so 
today.  Originally, the concept of prepositioning was implemented through the Near-
Term Prepositioning Ship (NTPS) Program in the late 1970s.  This program was a direct 
response to the world’s political situation at that time.  The Iranian Hostage Crisis, the 
Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, and the domestic uproar over two oil crises 
within the previous six years concerned the Government.  The US needed to establish a 
rapid response capability for its military forces, especially in the Persian Gulf region.  
The five ships of the NTPS Program consisted of two RO/RO ships and three break-bulk 
ships stationed in Diego Garcia.  The acquisition of the 13 MPS vessels in the Deal 
enabled the US to greatly expand its prepositioning capabilities.  The NTPS Program was 
eventually replaced by the MPS Program, and, as previously explained, expanded to three 
squadrons capable of extending its scope globally. 
 Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990-91 was the first test for the MPS 
Program.  All three squadrons were employed in this successful effort, which validated 
the decade-old MPF Program.  Following that conflict, MPS vessels were involved in 
Operation Fiery Vigil, the support of US forces and the Philippine people during the 
eruption and aftermath of Mount Pinatubo in 1991, and in Operation Restore Hope in 
1993, where the vessels supported USMC forces deployed to Somalia.  Other assists 
during the 1990s included relief operations for typhoon victims in South Asia. 
Upon entering its third decade, the vessels were again called to assist the Global 
War on Terrorism (GWOT).  For three years it has lent support to Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, and, more recently in January 2003, 11 of the 15 MPS 
vessels were offloaded in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  From a historical 
and operational standpoint, the MPS vessels’ availability during the waning years of the 
Cold War proved highly beneficial.  Were it not for the ability to acquire these ships 
under a long-term lease agreement, the opportunity to operate them at critical times in US 
History might not have been possible as the funds used to lease these ships would have 
likely been disbursed to other ship programs. 
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4. Tanker Program 
 The five T-5 tankers acquired in the Deal were not used in conjunction with the 
Maritime Prepositioning Ships but were instead used for a variety of purposes in the 
Sealift Program.  Annually, tankers of the Sealift Program (currently six long-term 
contract tankers and 38 voyage and short-term time-chartered vessels) deliver 
approximately 1.5 billion gallons of petroleum products (in 150 to 250 voyages) to DoD 
storage and distribution facilities around the globe.  These petroleum products consist of 
Navy jet fuel, marine diesel fuel (for Navy and NFAF ships), and kerosene-based jet fuel 
(for Army ground forces and Air Force aircraft).  In addition, they can deliver standard 
turbine fuel as necessary to US territories in the Pacific and to distant military bases such 
as Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the Aleutian Islands, and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.  
Recently, much of this re-fueling support was provided to coalition forces operating in 
OEF and OIF. 
 Of the five ships contracted under the Deal, two have the capability to pump 
petroleum from piers up to three miles away from the receiving facility by employing 
special equipment unique to these ships.  In addition, all T-5 tankers were designed with 
ice-strengthened double-hulls.  This hull structure enables these ships to conduct unique 
annual missions such as re-fueling the National Science Foundation’s McMurdo Station 
in Antarctica during Operation Deep Freeze (depicted in Figure 5), and the re-fueling of 
the US Air Force’s Thule Air Base in Greenland during Operation Pacer Goose (depicted 




Figure 5. USNS (then MV) Lawrence H Gianella (T-AOT 1125) Re-fueling 




Figure 6. USNS Paul Buck (T-AOT 1122) (center) Supporting Operation Pacer 
Goose 200315 
 
 The T-5 tankers routinely refuel NFAF oilers, as depicted in Figure 7.  These 
oilers, in turn, refuel underway navy combatants.  Although a capability not routinely 
employed, two T-5 tankers have modular fuel delivery systems that allow them to 
participate in underway replenishment exercises due to their ability to re-fuel naval 
combatants and NFAF ships.  
                                                 
14 Military Sealift Command. 2001 in Review. Sealift.  
http://www.msc.navy.mil/annualreport/2001/pm5.htm (accessed 21 September 2004). 
15 Military Sealift Command. 2003 in Review. Sealift. 
http://www.msc.navy.mil/annualreport/2003/pm5.htm (accessed 21 September 2004). 
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Figure 7. USNS Lawrence H. Gianella (T-AOT 1125) (at left) Refueling a NFAF 
Oiler while at Anchor16 
 
D. ARGENT GROUP LTD. 
The RFPs issued in 1982 for the MPS/T-5 vessels constituted the largest single 
private-sector US ship financing program undertaken by the Navy, representing over 
$2.65 billion.  While both the MPS and T-5 tanker solicitations were issued separately, 
MSC pre-determined a need for assistance in evaluating the numerous offers submitted in 
response to both RFPs.  On February 22, 1982, MSC issued RFP Number N00033-82-R-
0532, requesting a proposal for 2,000 hours of financial advisory services to effectively 
evaluate the financial aspects of all MPS/T-5 RFP submissions. 
Evan-Proctor Associates, Inc, which was renamed Argent Group Ltd. in early 
1982, was one of four companies that submitted financial service proposals.  MSC’s 
contracting and counsel staff considered each Offeror based on technical experience, 
                                                 
16 Military Sealift Command. 2002 in Review. Sealift. 
http://www.msc.navy.mil/annualreport/2002/pm5.htm (accessed 21 September 2004). 
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management experience and cost.  AGL was eventually awarded the contract on April 5, 
1982, based on its superior expertise in leveraged lease17 transactions. 
At the time, AGL was a specialized investment-banking firm that had substantial 
experience in structuring and implementing large-scale financing transactions.  Due to the 
scope and complexity of the $2.65 billion MPS/T-5 Deal, the Navy needed a financial 
advisor with leasing industry knowledge to guide it through the process.  Argent provided 
that guidance by conceiving, structuring and implementing financing packages for both 
the ship construction and post-delivery periods.  In addition, AGL served as the Navy’s 
exclusive financial advisor, obtaining financing, reviewing all offers, and serving as an 
information conduit between Congress, the Navy, and various contractors. 
AGL’s 2,000-hour contract was extended several times, and, ultimately, became a 
reimbursable cost contract.  Argent continues under contract aiding the Navy with 
additional work concerning the MPS/T-5 Program. 
 
                                                 
17 A leveraged lease is “A lease in which the lessor/owner purchases the equipment by making a 
specified equity investment and finances the remaining balance through a long term lender (or 
lenders). To be considered a leveraged lease, the financing provided by the lender must be substantial 
to the transaction, and be provided without recourse to the lessor.”  Referenced from Leasing 
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III. COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION OF MPS/T-5 TANKER 
DEAL 
A. STRUCTURE OF THE DEAL 
The Deal consisted of 13 MPS and five T-5 tankers.  Although each ship had a 
separate contract, the structure of each was the same; all were implemented together.  
Next, we will discuss the Deal’s key players, describe its structure as a whole and 
highlight any contractual differences where appropriate. 
 The Deal consisted of five principal participants (whether the vessels were in the 
construction or post-delivery period determined their degree of involvement).  The 
information below summarizes, in general, each participant and its role in the Deal. 
• Lessor: A collection of commercial banks and finance companies that 
provided, through a trust arrangement, approximately 30 percent of the vessel’s cost.  
These investors were also known as Owner-Participants.  Although they “owned” the 
vessels, they were passive owners because they did not have an active role in the ship’s 
management.  They invested their money with the expectation of a return on their 
investment through collection of lease payments and several tax benefits, including 
accelerated depreciation.  The Federal Financing Bank (FFB), a wholly owned 
corporation of the United States that provides loans to Federal agencies and non-Federal 
borrowers whose transactions are protected by Federal guarantees, provided the vessel’s 
remaining 70 percent financing cost.  The FFB represents the lowest financing cost 
available, lending at a pre-tax rate of one-eighth of one percent over the applicable 
Treasury rate. 
• Shipyard: Responsible for the vessel’s construction.  Each shipyard used 
current commercial specifications, known as American Bureau of Shipping Standards 
(ABS), to build each vessel and ensured the Navy’s operational and technical 
requirements were met. 
• Contractor: A special purpose entity established by the Offeror (General 
Dynamics Corporation, Maersk Line, Limited, or Waterman Steamship Corporation) who 
was responsible for contracting with the shipyard for vessel construction or conversion, 
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as applicable, and to enter into a supervisory construction and operating agreement with 
the company who would operate the vessel upon its completion. 
• Operator: Supervises the vessel during construction and operates it 
following construction.  A supervisory fee is paid for the former and an operating hire 
payment paid for the latter.  The Contractor makes both payments to the Operator. 
• Navy: Signs a contract with the Contractor for the build and charter of 
each vessel and pays nothing during vessel construction.  Upon delivery and the Navy’s 
subsequent acceptance, the Navy pays a semi-annual charter hire payment to the 
Contractor until the contract’s termination.  Capital hire payments are made on a “hell or 
high water” basis, meaning that the Navy unconditionally guarantees its capital hire 
payment obligations as defined in the contract. 
   
Table 2 describes how the Deal was structured and Figures 8 and 9 provide a 




Table 2. Deal Structure Summary18 
 








5 TAKX Morgan Guaranty Trust 
Co. of NY 













5 T-5 Shearson Leasing Corp. The American 
Shipbuilding Co. 
 
                                                 
18 Author’s recreation of information obtained from Solomon Brothers, Inc.  See Solomon Brothers, 
Inc. Equity Participations in the Leveraged Lease Financing of Eighteen Vessels Estimated Aggregate 
Cost of $2,650,000 to be Time Chartered to The United States of America Acting through the 










Figure 9. Post-Delivery Structure20 
 
 
                                                 
19 Key Considerations Regarding A Charter and Build Program for Auxiliary Dry Cargo Carriers. 
Argent Group Ltd. November 1997, 6. 
20 Ibid, 7. 
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 The Deal’s overall structure consisted of four main parts: construction, financing, 
delivery and time charter arrangements.21  Each part is summarized below:22 
 
• Construction: 
o Contractor negotiated a fixed-price construction contract with the 
shipyard and provided progress payments during construction. 
o Contractor arranged for interim loans to finance the construction. 
The Contractor assumed all risk associated with the loans until an acceptable vessel was 
delivered to the Navy. 
o Contractor was responsible for supervising the construction to 
ensure the vessel was completed according to the specifications and plans submitted by 
the Offeror (who included the Navy’s operational and technical requirements in its 
specifications and plans to the Contractor).  As discussed earlier, the Contractor paid a 
supervisory fee to the Operator to supervise vessel construction. 
o The Navy retained the right to inspect the construction, but it could 
not deal directly with the shipyard, nor did it have any supervisory obligations, unilateral 
design change rights or liability to the Shipyard in the event of cost overruns. 
 
• Financing: 
o Prior to delivery, the Contractor arranged permanent financing for 
the vessel, consisting of equity from private investors and debt from the FFB. 
o The private investors (a.k.a “Equity Participants”) invested 
approximately 30 percent of the vessel’s cost and, through the Owner-Trustee, assumed 
ownership of the vessel on or before the vessel’s delivery date.  As such, they were 
eligible, under then current legislation, to receive certain tax benefits (e.g., accelerated 
depreciation) associated with ownership. 
                                                 
21 Argent Group, Ltd. T-5 Tanker Replacement Supplemental Report: Relative Financing Costs of 
Charter and Purchase. 30 September 1982, A-3 - A-5. 
22 Although the information for this section originates from Argent Group, Ltd.’s T-5 Tanker 
Replacement Supplemental Report, the Deal structure for both the T-5 tankers and the TAKX ships 
are, in general, equivalent. 
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o The debt was issued by the Owner-Trustee in the form of long-
term (20.25-year) bonds purchased by the FFB.  All debt funds flowed directly to the 
FFB, which held a mortgage on the vessel to secure the debt. 
 
• Delivery: 
o When the vessel was completed, it was delivered to the Owner-
Trustee, who simultaneously delivered it to the Contractor under a Bareboat Charter.23 
The proceeds of the debt and equity financing were used to pay off the interim 
construction loans. 
o The Bareboat Charterer (Amsea, Maersk, Waterman, or Ocean 
Carriers, as applicable) began operating the vessel for the Contractor under the operating 
contract.  The vessel was chartered to the Navy under the Time Charter provisions.24 
Upon delivery, the fixed costs of the vessel were adjusted to reflect actual interest rates 
paid during construction on the interim construction loans. 
 
• Time Charter: 
o The Navy began its charter hire payments (which are made up of 
both the capital hire and operating hire payments) upon delivery and acceptance of each 
vessel. 
o The capital hire payment was made on a “hell or high water” basis. 
Upon delivery, the capital hire rates were adjusted to reflect the actual debt and equity 
financing rates.  Subsequently, the debt rates were fixed, giving rise to an adjustment in 
the capital hire rates.  Once the rates were adjusted, the Navy’s capital hire rates were 
fixed for the entire charter period.  Rent paid to the Owner-Trustee under the Bareboat 
Charter corresponded to the capital hire paid under the Time Charter. 
                                                 
23 A bareboat charter is an arrangement where ownership of a vessel is provided to the chartering 
entity, which may, at its discretion, operate the vessel itself or charter it to another entity. 
24 A time charter is an arrangement where the owners of a vessel charter the use of its vessel to 
another entity. 
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o The terms for the Time Charters are as follows: MPS – five year 
contract with four renewal periods (total of 25 years); T-5 – five year contract with three 
renewal period (total of 20 years).  If the Navy fails to exercise a renewal option or 
terminates for convenience after the initial period, the vessel will be sold and the Navy 
must pay the difference between the selling price and the pre-determined termination 
value (see Appendix C for Maersk Vessel Number Three and Shipholdings Vessel 
Number Three termination values).  The termination value is designed to repay the debt 
and equity participants for the return of and return on their investment.  However, the 
Navy may, at its option, purchase the vessels at the higher of termination or market value. 
The operating hire component is paid to the Bareboat Charterer (i.e., Contractor) 
for the vessel’s operation.  It includes operating expenses and a profit factor as agreed to 
in the Offer.  The Contractor assumes the risk for all off-hire provisions and ship non-
performance.  The Time Charter also contains economic inflation provisions to 
compensate the Bareboat Charterer for increases in crew wages, stores and subsistence, 
maintenance and insurance.  Provisions for loss of the vessel are also included. 
B. COST EFFECTIVENESS AND CONTROVERSY OF LEASING 
The controversy surrounding the decision to lease versus purchase (LvP) thirteen 
MPS and five T-5 tankers is rich in discussion and content.  In this section, we will walk 
the reader through the Navy’s leasing history up to its 1982 decision to charter and build 
the MPS and T-5 tankers.  Specifically, we will highlight the 1972 controversy regarding 
the build and charter of nine Sealift tankers; identify the timeline of the 1982-83 charter 
and build program, including key players and their role in the LvP analysis; and, finally, 
we will summarize, in a net present value (NPV) context, the three major LvP issues the 
Deal created. 
1. History 
The Navy has a long-standing leasing history dating back to World War I. 
Supporting this history is the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, a Congressional mandate to 
create a United States merchant marine force that would be utilized to operate vessels and 
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transport items as directed by the Federal Government.25  Everett Pyatt, Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics), in his February 28, 1983, 
statement regarding the TAXK Program before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the 
House Ways and Means Committee, summarized the Navy’s leasing history and its 
relationship with the Merchant Marines as follows: 
The chartering of merchant ships by Government agencies is not a new 
concept. During World Wars I and II, the predecessors of the Maritime 
Administration engaged in a large-scale chartering of US merchant ships 
for the carriage of vital war materials and supplies. The Navy, during 
World War II, chartered over 450 merchant ships for the same purpose. At 
the outbreak of the Korean War, the Navy had only six merchant ships 
under charter. Within 90 days, that number had increased to 216. 
Similarly, at the height of the war in Viet Nam, the Navy had over 200 
ships under charter. Today [in 1983], the Navy’s Military Sealift 
Command continues to charter merchant ships, [sic] for periods ranging 
from the length of a single voyage to five years. …Since the early 1950’s, 
the Navy has, with the foreknowledge and approval of Congress, used the 
build and charter [leasing] method to obtain the services of one cargo ship 
and 29 tankers. This concept has proven valuable and a proper reliance on 
the merchant marine to furnish goods and services needed by the Navy.26 
 
 On June 20, 1972, the Navy entered into a build and charter agreement for nine 
Sealift tankers.  Considering the Navy’s past leasing success, this deal was not unusual.  
Originally, the tankers were to be built using appropriated procurement funds, but 
budgetary constraints during that period prevented the Navy from pursuing this option.  
Thus, the Navy chose to enter into a 20-year long-term lease.27 
 Disagreement, however, existed between the DoD and Congress (particularly, the 
Government Accounting Office (GAO)) regarding the leasing arrangement’s tax 
treatment and the discount rate selection used in the LvP analysis, which subsequently led 
                                                 
25 Maritime Administration. 1 USC. 101 (46 App. USC. 1101 (2002)). 
http://www.marad.dot.gov/publications/complaw03/Title%20I_Merch.%20Marine%20Act%201936.ht
ml (accessed 28 October 2004). 
26 Everett Pyatt. Statement before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Ways and Means 
Committee on the Navy’s TAKX Program. 28 February 1983. 
27 Jackson, L. and Clapp, D. Jr., “Build and Charter of the Sealift Tankers.” Naval Engineer’s Journal 
(April 1975): 19. 
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to different conclusions.  Table 3 highlights the differences and conclusions between the 
GAO and DoD.28 
   
Table 3. Differences Between the GAO and DoD Regarding the 1972 Charter and 
Build Program for Nine Tanker Ships 
 
GAO Controversy DoD 
The Owner-Participants bought tax 
breaks because they deferred their 
taxes to the latter portion of the 20-
year contract.  A taxpayer in the 
46% tax bracket, for example, 
would receive $0.46 in tax-free 
money for every dollar, which the 
investor would, presumably, 
reinvest.  Federal tax revenue that 
was “lost” to the investor in the 
form of accelerated depreciation 
would be counted as a cost of 
leasing.  Owner-Participants 
furnished 25% of the total 
investment capital.  Bondholders 
contributed the remaining 75%. 
Tax 
Treatment 
Tax incentives such as the 
investment tax credit and 
accelerated depreciation are 
designed to promote long-term 
economic benefits for the economy 
and, thus, would not be considered 
a loss of Government revenue.  
Same 3-to-1 Bondholder 
debt/Owner-Participant equity ratio 
applied. 
Used 6% based on the average 
yield on 20-year Treasury bonds. 
Discount 
Rate 
Used 10% based on DoD 
Instruction 7041.3 (DoD Cost 
Comparison Handbook), which 
was also stipulated in OMB 
Circular A-94.  The OMB rate 
(10%) was an estimate of the 
                                                 
28 United States Government Accounting Office. Build and Charter Program for Nine Tanker Ships. 
August 1973. (Report No. B-174839). 
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average return for private 
investment before taxes and after 
inflation.  In the absence of any 
other analyses stating what the 
discount rate should be, DoD chose 
10%.  The GAO’s use of 6%, 
according to the DoD, was a matter 
of opinion. 
Used 15% based on the estimate 
provided to the IRS. 
Residual 
Value 
Used 5% as the “normal” value of 
MSC ships when held until 
retirement. 
Purchasing is more cost effective 
by $29.6 million. 
NPV 
Conclusions 
Leasing is more cost effective by 
$10.4 million. 
 
 The 1972 tanker deal highlights two major variables in the LvP decision: After-
tax returns and discount rate selection.  Unfortunately, very little LvP analysis criteria 
had been published prior to 1980 upon which Government entities could firmly base their 
analyses.  In fact, the GAO Report Build and Charter for Nine Sealift Tanker Ships was 
the only document prior to July 1979 that discussed Federal Government leasing issues.29  
Without an objective means to establish a discount rate, the DoD and GAO developed 
what each considered its best estimate; each, however, reached opposite conclusions. 
 The 1982 build and charter arrangement received significantly more interest and 
scrutiny than did its predecessors.  To provide context and communicate this program’s 
high visibility and great complexity, we will journey through the MPS and T-5 tanker 
timeline identifying, as appropriate, the Program’s key players (annotated with an 
asterisk “*”) and their role in the LvP analyses. 
 
                                                 
29 Mary Ann Peters, “Is Leasing by the Federal Government A Good Thing for the American 
Taxpayer?” (Ph.D. diss., Golden Gate University, 1979), ii. 
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2. Timeline30 
• August 1979 – MPS Program authorized by the Honorable Harold Brown, 
Secretary of Defense. 
 
• September 8, 1980 – MPS Program authorized by Congress*. 
 
• October, 14 1981 – RFPs submitted, permitting either a charter or 
purchase of ships. 
 
• November 1981 – Navy* and DoD* personnel conduct an informal 
meeting with IRS personnel regarding the impending Deal.  No binding decisions 
made.31 
 
• December 8, 1981 – Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the convert 
and charter program for inclusion in the fiscal year 1983 budget with OMB 
concurrence.32 
 
• February 11, 1982 – Coopers and Lybrand (C&L)*, a “Big 8” accounting 
firm hired by the Navy to conduct a LvP analysis, completed its study.33  C&L’s model 
calculated the Lessor’s after-tax cash flow stream and solved for lease payments.  It 
allowed for changes in financial, tax and economic variables such as discount rate, tax 
benefit, marginal tax rate, residual value and internal rate of return.  C&L reported that 
                                                 
30 The TAKX and T-5 Replacement Tanker program chronology was assembled by the authors using 
Government and civilian sources who had direct involvement with the Program.  These sources 
include, but are not limited to, the GAO, Congressional testimonies, and Argent Group Ltd.  Other 
sources and amplifying information will be footnoted accordingly.  
31 John Lehman, Jr. Statement to Charles B. Rangel, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight, House 
Ways and Means Committee. 18 March 1983, 5. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Analysis of the Convert and Charter Program. Coopers and Lybrand, 1982. 
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the Navy could charter a vessel at a present value cost as much as 35 percent below the 
acquisition cost if most of the following conditions occurred: 
o The IRS treats the charters as service contracts;34 
o Long-term interest rates decline to approximately 12 percent;35 
o The Lessor will accept a 12 percent after-tax return on his 
investment;36 
o The Lessor can reinvest positive cash flow at a rate comparable to the 
return on the project;37 
o The Lessor and the lender will accept an equity position of less than 
20 percent;38 and, 
o The Lessor takes advantage of tax benefits available through the 
Maritime Administration’s Capital Construction Fund (CCF) program.”39 40 
Other assumptions made by C&L include the use of a ten percent discount rate 
and $108 million total purchase cost per TAKX unit; calculations based after-tax cash 
flows, five-year accelerated depreciation, and a 20 percent residual value.  C&L also 
argued that tax revenue losses should not be included in the total cost of the Government 
because: (1) it assumed that the tax revenue losses would still occur if the charter 
programs did not exist, and (2) the tax revenue losses did not consider the tax 
                                                 
34 The IRS issued a 143-page private letter ruling on December 10, 1984, which stated that the Time 
Charter was a “true lease” for tax purposes and, thus, the investment tax credit would not be available 
(see Forman, Jonathan. “Tax Considerations in Renting A Navy.” Tax Notes, 25 March 1985, 1193). 
35 Long-term interest rate (i.e., Treasury borrowing rate) in 1982 was 13 percent.  The charter, when 
considered as a 25-year loan, has an effective interest rate of 7 percent--well below the 13 percent 
long-term interest rate (see TAKX Maritime Prepositioning Ships: Relative Financing Costs of Charter 
and Purchase – Supplemental Report. Argent Group Ltd, 1982, 25). 
36 Actual after-tax return on equity was 11.745 percent. 
37 The actual reinvestment rate the Lessor’s received is not known; however, positive reinvestment 
cash flows can be reasonably assumed. 
38 Actual equity position was approximately 30 percent. 
39 The CCF program was not utilized. 
40 Ibid, II-1-II-2. 
 33
implications on real economic activity.41  In other words, investors seeking tax shelters 
for their money would see the MPS/T-5 Program as an attractive way to do so.  In the 
absence of similar programs, investors would devote their money to other tax-sheltering 
investments, resulting in the same net tax revenue “loss” to the Government.  
Accordingly, the tax benefits realized by the investor could be utilized for additional 
purchases, investments, etc., which have a positive, multiplying effect on the economy by 
actually increasing Treasury revenues through taxes on income received through the 
additional investments. 
 
• March 1982 – Initial offers received. 
 
• April 1982 – Through a competitive bid process, AGL* was selected to assist the 
Navy in analyzing the financial aspects of the Deal’s transactions. 
 
• May 28, 1982 – The Honorable John F. Lehman, Jr.* (SECNAV), Secretary of 
Navy, sends a letter to the House Appropriations Committee stating that the Navy intends 
to maintain its policies in support of the American Merchant Marine and the American 
Shipbuilding Industry. 
 
• July 1982 – AGL submitted initial reports on the relative financing costs of the 
charter and purchase.42 43 
 
• July 20, 1982 – Congressman Joseph P. Addabbo, Chairman, Defense 
Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, stated in a letter to the SECNAV 
                                                 
41 Analysis of the Convert and Charter Program. Coopers and Lybrand, 1982, B-1.  
42 TAKX Maritime Prepositioning Ships: Relative Financing Costs of Charter and Purchase. Argent 
Group Ltd., July 1982.  Report was superceded in August 1982, based on updated information 
contained in the firm offers of which the Navy accepted.  
43 T-5 Tanker Replacement: Relative Financing Costs of Charter and Purchase. Argent Group Ltd., 
July 1982.  Report was superceded in September 1982, based on updated information contained in the 
firm offers of which the Navy accepted. 
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that the Navy’s original plans called for procurement of new and converted ships (the 
fiscal year 1982 Budget Amendment changed it to a charter arrangement).  He also 
directed the Navy not to enter any contractual agreements with respect to the Deal until 
Congress reviewed the Investigative Staff’s LvP analysis of present value costs to the 
Government.44 
 
• July 30, 1982 – SECNAV agrees to “withhold any firm contractual arrangements” 
until Congress can take a look at the Deal.45 
 
• August 1982 – The Deal’s source selection completed. 
 
• August 17, 1982 – Congress advised that a selection and review process had been 
initiated for six firm contracts and seven options as defined in Section 303 of the FY 1983 
Authorization Act.  Section 303 required the Navy to notify “the Committees on Armed 
Services and on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives of [a] 
proposed lease” and the elapse of “a period of thirty days…after the date on which such 
Committees receive such notification.”46  Section 303 further provided that “any such 
notification shall include a description of the terms of the proposed lease and a 
justification for entering into such lease rather than obtaining the vessel involved by 
acquisition.”47  The Navy also awarded contracts to build and charter six TAKX ships 
with options to award seven additional TAKX ships in fiscal year 1983.48 
 
                                                 
44 Joseph Addabbo. Letter to the Honorable John F. Lehman. 20 July 1982.  
45 Joseph Addabbo. Letter to the Honorable John F. Lehman. 16 September 1982. 
46 Everett Pyatt. Statement before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Ways and Means 
Committee on the Navy’s TAKX Program. 28 February 1983, 3. 
47 Ibid. 
48 It is unclear when the SECNAV received Congressional authorization to proceed with the contract 
awards, but one can reasonably assume he had such permission. 
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• August 18, 1982 – Public notified of contract award and amount.49 
 
• August 19, 1982 – AGL submitted supplemental report on the TAKX MPS 
Program.50  This report utilized actual cost data as stipulated in the firm contract offer. 
AGL concluded that the Navy’s present value cost to charter the TAKX vessels would be 
$140.56 million per vessel, compared to a purchase cost of $184.01 million.  Table 4 
contains AGL’s basic assumptions:51 
 
Table 4. AGL LvP Basic Assumptions for TAKX Vessels 
 
Assumption Value 
Capitalized Cost of Vessel $184.01 million
Cash Purchase Cost of Vessel $184.01 million
Long-Term Debt Rate 13% 
Equity Yield 23% 
Investment Tax Credit (ITC) 10% 
Depreciation 5-year ACRS 
Residual Value of Vessel 0% 
Discount Rate 10% 
 
o Capitalized cost of the vessel (i.e., the total amount to be financed) was 
calculated by averaging the proposal amounts of the 13 TAKX vessels, which were 
subsequently adjusted to reflect the 14.5 percent prime interest rate that existed on the 
award date (August 17, 1982).  The average capitalized cost was $184.01 million per 
vessel, which was assumed to be paid in cash as opposed to Treasury debt financed. 
                                                 
49 “Pentagon Plans Ship Charters of $802.8 Million,” Wall Street Journal, 18 August 1982. 
50 TAKX Maritime Prepositioning Ships: Relative Financing Costs of Charter and Purchase – 
Supplemental Report. Argent Group Ltd, 1982. 
51 Ibid, Appendix A.  Only key assumptions listed. 
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o Long-term debt rate of 13 percent chosen as a realistic value of the 
Government’s cost of borrowing in August 1982. 
o Pre-tax equity yield of 23 percent reflected in the proposals, which 
represented a fair market value for such transactions. 
o Ten percent ITC selected for the base case; however, a “non-ITC” 
alternative case was also analyzed, which increased the charter cost by $23.57 million 
from a Navy-only perspective, but from a net total cost to the Government (NTCG) 
perspective (i.e., including the net Treasury cash flows from revenue inflows and 
tax/depreciation outflows), the non-ITC case was $3.84 million less expensive.  AGL 
explained that this phenomenon occurs because “the non-ITC case does not have the 
large front-end Treasury outflow that is contained in the ITC case, but rather has larger 
capital hire payments occurring later, along with greater debt service requirements by 
virtue of greater leverage…on a present value basis at [a] 10% [discount rate], the net 
result to the Government is a lower cost.”52  Both the ITC and non-ITC cases 
demonstrated that leasing was more cost effective than purchasing. 
o AGL selected depreciation based on the five-year accelerated cost 
recovery system (ACRS).  This method provided a significant tax benefit to the Lessor, 
which he would, in turn, pass the majority of the benefits back to the Navy in the form of 
lower capital hire payments. 
o Zero residual value chosen because the after-tax present value of a vessel 
after 25 years would be minimal. 
o Ten percent discount rate utilized as prescribed by OMB Circulars A-76, 
A-94 and in the DoD Cost Comparison Handbook (DoD Instruction 7041.3). 
o NTCG also considered.  NTCG is the present value sum of the rental, or 
capital hire, payments and the net effect on Treasury tax revenues as a result of the tax 
inflows and outflows generated by the Deal.  For the TAKX vessels, the NTCG for 
leasing was $157.33 million compared to a $184.01 million purchase price.  The NTCG 
                                                 
52 Ibid, 16. 
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assumes that taxes paid by the investor would not otherwise be sheltered—an argument 
that AGL believed was doubtful.53 
o Although the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) 
had not yet become law, the effect of TEFRA would result in an $8.3 million per ship 
present value increase in the 25-year charter hire payment.54 
 
• September 1, 1982 – Surveys and Investigations (S&I) Report submitted to the 
House Appropriations Committee.55  The S&I Report concluded that “using present 
value analysis and the OMB directed 10 percent present value discount rate, leasing the 
TAKX ships is advantageous to the Navy and the Government at all long-term interest 
rates less than 18-19 percent.”56  The Staff, however, had reservations about a possible 
adverse impact on the Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) due to the use of existing obligational 
authority rather than requesting specific Congressional approval and additional authority 
for both lease costs and termination liabilities.  The S&I Report emphasized that 
obligations made on the Fund cannot exceed its unobligated balance, which the TAKX 
Program and its long-term obligations were in danger of doing. 
 
• September 14, 1982 – Senator John Tower, Chairman, Senate Armed Services 
Committee, wrote the SECNAV stating that the Navy was in compliance with Section 
303 of the fiscal year 1983 Authorization Act and approved the Navy’s pursuit of the 
TAKX vessels.57 
 
                                                 
53 Ibid, 2. 
54 Ibid, 24. 
55 C.R. Anderson. Memorandum to Joseph P. Addabbo, Chairman, Defense Subcommittee of the 
House Appropriations Committee regarding TAKX Ship Acquisition Program for the US Navy 
Maritime Preposition Ship Program. 1 September 1982. 
56 Ibid, 5. 
57 John Tower. Letter to the Honorable John Lehman. 14 September 1982. 
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• September 16, 1982 – Congressman Addabbo wrote the SECNAV to inform him 
the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee agreed, based on the 
S&I Report, that leasing the TAKX vessels was the better option.58 
• September 17, 1982 – House Subcommittee on Readiness holds a hearing on the 
TAKX Program.59 
o George Sawyer, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding and 
Logistics) stated that annual capital charter costs would be $14.95 million based on 
anticipated interest costs, which were $20 million less per ship than expected. 
o Congressman Dan Daniel, Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness 
expressed dissatisfaction with the Navy’s use of long-term leases which “effectively 
circumvents the Congressional authorization/appropriations process and impedes timely 
and effective legislative review [and that] [o]nce the contract [had] been signed a long-
term and binding Government obligation [would be] incurred that leaves Congress with 
the choice of providing the necessary funds or facing the unattractive prospect of 
substantial termination costs and possible legal implications.”60  So adamant was his 
belief against Congressional side-stepping that in his approval statement of the TAKX 
Program to Congressman Price, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, he 
said “[t]o allow this kind of situation to develop again would be intolerable and [that he 
would] do [his] utmost to see that appropriate action is taken to prevent such an 
occurrence.”61  
 
• September 30, 1982 – AGL submitted its T-5 Tanker Replacement Supplemental 
Report.62  This report utilized actual cost data as stipulated in the firm contract offer. 
                                                 
58 Joseph Addabbo. Letter to the Honorable John Lehman. 16 September 1982. 
59 George Sawyer and Dan Daniel. Statements made before the Subcommittee on Readiness of the 
House Armed Services Committee. 17 September 1982. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 T-5 Tanker Replacement: Relative Financing Costs of Charter and Purchase – Supplemental 
Report. Argent Group Ltd. 30 September 1982.  
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AGL concluded that the Navy’s present value cost to charter the T-5 vessels would be 
$49.54 million per vessel, compared to a purchase cost of $66 million.  The analysis 
included the TEFRA revisions.  Table 5 contains AGL’s basic assumptions: 
 
Table 5. AGL LvP Basic Assumptions for the T-5 Vessels 
 
Assumption Value 
Capitalized Cost of Vessel $66 million 
Cash Purchase Cost of Vessel $66 million 
Long-Term Debt Rate 11% 
Equity Yield 21% 
Investment Tax Credit (ITC) 10% 
Depreciation 5-year ACRS
Residual Value of Vessel 0% 
Discount Rate 10% 
 
 
o Capitalized cost of the vessel was calculated by averaging the proposal 
amounts of the five T-5 vessels.  The assumption was a cash purchase of the vessel on the 
scheduled delivery date (if the purchase option was pursued), or, if leased, the scheduled 
delivery date would be the charter start date. 
o Long-term debt rate of 11 percent chosen as a realistic value of the 
Government’s cost of borrowing in September 1982. 
o Pre-tax equity yield of 21 percent reflected in the proposals, which 
represented a fair market value for such transactions. 
o Ten percent ITC selected for the base case.  The “non-ITC” alternative 
case increased the charter cost by $6.56 million from a Navy-only perspective.  However, 
from a total Government perspective, the non-ITC case was $1.24 million less expensive 
than the ITC case.  Both the ITC and non-ITC cases demonstrated that leasing was more 
cost effective than purchasing. 
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o AGL selected depreciation based on a five-year ACRS.  This method 
provided a significant tax benefit to the Lessor, which he would, in turn, pass the majority 
of the benefits back to the Navy in the form of lower capital hire payments. 
o Zero residual value chosen because the after-tax present value of a vessel 
after 20 years would be minimal. 
o Ten percent discount rate utilized as prescribed by OMB Circulars A-76, 
A-94 and in the DoD Cost Comparison Handbook (DoD Instruction 7041.3). 
o The NTCG for leasing was $53.59 million compared to a $66 million 
purchase price.  Again, AGL’s analysis assumed the tax benefits realized by investors in 
the Deal were not incremental Government outflows; as such investors would invest in 
other similar transactions if the Deal had not occurred.63 
 
• December 2, 1982 – The Comptroller of the Navy requested the legal 
opinion of the United States Comptroller General (USCGEN) as to the proper manner in 
which to record certain obligations of the NIF in connection with the MPS/T-5 Program. 
 
• January 14, 1983 – GAO opinion regarding termination liability 
accounting obtained.  Options on the last seven ships exercised. 
 
• January 28, 1983 – USCGEN’s office issued its report on the NIF in 
connection with the MPS/T-5 Program:64 
o Upon vessel acceptance, the Navy must record the base period costs plus 
termination expenses as firm obligations against the NIF. 
o The Navy remained cautious of over-obligating the NIF.  At that time, the 
NIF had sufficient resources to cover only $2.2 billion in new obligations (the 18 MPS/T-
5 vessels represented approximately $2.65 billion in aggregate cost).  If the Navy had to 
record these firm obligations, it would have been required to scale back the MPS/T-5 
                                                 
63 Ibid, 2. 
64 United States Comptroller General. Navy Industrial Fund: Obligations in Connection with Long-
Term Vessel Charters. 28 January 1983. (File No. B-174839). 
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Program or risk violating the Anti-Deficiency Act, which provided that “An officer or 
employee of the United States Government or of the District of Columbia Government 
may not—(A) make or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount 
available in an appropriation or fund for the expenditure or obligation; or (B) involve 
either Government in a contract or obligation for the payment of money before an 
appropriation is made unless authorized by law.”65 
o Contingent liabilities were to be recorded as expenses to the extent that it 
was probable that (1) the liability would be incurred, and (2) the liability could have been 
reasonably estimated. 
o The USCGEN concluded by stating “[i]t is [the USCGEN’s] view…that 
each Charter Party, once in effect, should be recorded as a firm obligation to pay lease 
costs for a 5-year base period, plus termination costs after that time.  This would 
represent the least amount for which the Government will be liable under the contract” 
and recommended, among other suggestions, that the Navy approach Congress for 
specific statutory authority to proceed, and include in its request any anticipated 
reimbursements from future orders as budgetary resources of the NIF.66 
o USCGEN posed no legal objection to the Deal so long as the NIF had the 
unobligated balance to cover the vessel’s cost. 
 
• January 31, 1983 – “Rent-a-Navy” article appears in the Washington Post, 
which declared that the majority of the Deal’s cost is hidden from view because it shows 
up as a tax loss to the Treasury rather than a direct cost in the budget and that “Congress 
owes it to itself and the taxpayer to tell the Pentagon to terminate [the] leases 
immediately and to prohibit the evasion of budget limits.”67 
 
                                                 
65 31 U.S.C. Section 1341(a)(1), recodified from 31 USC. Section 665(a) (1976). 
66 Ibid, 5-6. 
67 “Rent-a-Navy,” Washington Post, 31 January 1983. 
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• February 1983 – Institute for Defense Analyses (Program Analysis 
Division) (IDA) prepared a LvP analysis for the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(Research and Engineering).68 
 
• February 15, 1983 – Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT)* issued its report 
on the Tax Aspects of Federal Leasing.69 
o JCT stated that “the Federal Government, which enjoys the best credit, 
cannot [theoretically] gain by financing long-term capital projects through parties that 
require higher yields [because] [t]he market rate of interest paid by the lessor and the rate 
of return expected by its shareholders generally exceed the interest rate on Government 
bonds [due to] the Government’s superior credit.  Therefore, when the Government 
leases, it compensates the lessor for greater financing costs than the Government would 
have borne had it borrowed funds and purchased the ships.”70 
o JCT concluded that the Government would pay $20.8 million (on a present 
value basis) or more to charter each TAKX ship than it would to purchase the vessel 
using 100 percent Treasury debt financing. 
o JCT did not consider the cash inflow from income taxes the debt lender 
would pay as the borrower makes his debt payments, because the Government’s use of a 
pre-tax method of accounting, coupled with the Treasury cash inflows that would result 
from a Treasury-financed purchase, would negate one another and have a zero net 
Treasury effect. 
                                                 
68 Paul Munyon and John Wells. Institute for Defense Analyses, Program Analysis Division. Lease 
Versus Purchase of Naval Auxiliary Ships. February 1983. (IDA Paper P-1665).  This report used 
similar assumptions and methodology as AGL and, thus, concluded that leasing was the more cost 
effective option.  This report was subsequently revised in November 1983 to re-examine IDA’s 
methodology for calculating Government costs. See Chapter III.B.2 in “November 1983” portion of 
timeline for details. 
69 United States Joint Committee on Taxation. Tax Aspects of Federal Leasing Arrangements. 15 
February 1983. AGL rebuts JCT’s assumptions in the March 25, 1983, portion of the timeline, the 
summary of which can be found in Table 6. 
70 Ibid, 2;18. 
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o JCT also cited AGL for “double-counting” by crediting the Lender’s cash 
inflows from the lease but not counting similar Treasury cash inflows from financing a 
purchase.71 
o JCT assumed a residual value of $5.1 million (present value dollars). 
o JCT believed that the tax benefits of the Deal should be counted as part of 
the Government’s total cost. Specifically, JCT stated that 
  
Two consultants’ reports commissioned by the Navy [AGL and C&L] 
contend that none of the tax benefits generated by a TAKX arrangement 
should be counted as a Government cost of leasing…[This] argument for 
not counting the tax benefits assumes that private parties would find an 
alternative means of sheltering their income from tax if the TAKX 
opportunity were not available.  In effect, the argument assumes that the 
totality of investors, when presented with an additional profitable 
investment in TAKX ships, abandons or fails to start certain other 
investments which it also regards as profitable and would have carried out 
(but for the TAKX opportunity).  The realistic response, on the contrary, is 
for investors to add the TAKX arrangements to the pool of profitable 
ventures to be undertaken.  This increases the total amount of tax benefits 
claimed for investments.  But even if investors were to react as the 
argument assumes, it would mean that the tax benefits going to the TAKX 
program were crowding out investments in other sectors of the economy. 
[Therefore, the] lost investment represents a social cost that is properly 
attributed to the TAKX program.  Thus, in either event, net tax benefits to 
the Navy’s lessor should be counted in the Government’s total cost of 
leasing a TAKX ship.72 
 
• February 23, 1983 – Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) wrote  
Donald T. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury, to describe the tax indemnification provision 
of the Deal as “outrageous” and asked him to “raise in the Cabinet the question of 
whether it is appropriate and acceptable for [the Navy] to subsidize a legal case against 
the IRS.”73  The “subsidization” of which Senator Metzenbaum spoke centered on the 
                                                 
71 Ibid, 21. 
72 Ibid, 18-19. 
73 Forman, Jonathan. “Tax Considerations in Renting A Navy,” Tax Notes, 23 February 1983, 1196. 
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Navy’s assumption of the legal fees associated with contesting a claim with the IRS if the 
Navy so directed the Contractor.  Similar provisions, according to AGL, were (and are) 
common in commercial ship leases.  The Navy was not obligated to indemnify or adjust 
charter hire as a result of an adverse IRS decision on any issues that had been addressed 
in the advance IRS rulings on the Deal.  In fact, the adjustment in charter hire permitted 
and/or the Navy’s indemnification obligations were limited to four events:74 
o A change in Federal tax law between the Best and Final offer and delivery 
of each ship; 
o The Time Charter ruled by the IRS to be a lease of the ship to the Navy 
rather than a service contract; 
o A Navy breach of its contractual and legal obligations; and/or 
o Navy-originated permanent modifications made to the vessels. 
 
• February 25, 1983 – Article “Navy Promises Suppliers Tax Breaks” 
published in the Washington Post.75  Senator Metzenbaum again voiced his displeasure 
regarding the Deal: “The whole idea of the Navy leasing ships instead of buying them has 
raised some eyebrows on [Capitol Hill], but discovering that we would subsidize these 
companies if the Internal Revenue Service rules against these questionable tax breaks is 
absolutely unbelievable.”76  The Navy responded that it had “executed a charter program 
for cargo-carrying services based on sound business practices, [that it was] mindful of 
current tax laws and the best interests of the American people, [and that it did so] in full 
and public view with the express permission of Congress.”77  The article likened the tax 
breaks as a practice similar to the buying and selling of corporate tax breaks that were 
allowed in the 1981 tax bill, but subsequently restricted by Congress in the TEFRA. 
                                                 
74 John Lehman. Response to Charles B. Rangel’s, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of the 
House Ways and Means Committee request for answers to additional Committee questions from the 
Subcommittee’s February 28, 1983 hearing on Federal leasing practices. 18 March 1983.  





• February 28, 1983 – Everett Pyatt, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics), statement before the Subcommittee on Oversight 
of the House Ways and Means Committee regarding the Navy’s TAKX Program:78 
o The Program allowed the use of commercial specifications, which reduced 
the program’s cost by $35 million per ship.79  
o Congressional review included a study by the House Appropriations 
Committee Staff (S&I), hearings by the House Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee 
and staff reviews by the above committees plus the Subcommittee on Oversight and the 
House Ways and Means Committee—all provided written concurrence that allowed the 
Navy to award the TAKX build and charter contracts.80  
o The Navy also received written correspondence from three of the four 
Committees agreeing to the T-5 build and charter contracts.  The fourth allowed the 30-
day review time period (as required by law) to expire.  The Navy delayed the T-5 
conversion an additional 53 days before it informed the Contractor to proceed—the Navy 
granting permission to proceed was necessary to avoid cost overruns that the Navy would 
have had to pay as a result of the delay.81 
o Pyatt stated that the conclusions of the independent LvP studies indicated 
that chartering the TAKX/T-5 vessels could save the Navy 19 percent of the ship’s cost 
in present value dollars.  However, he also revealed that the assumptions (i.e., discount 
rate, pre-tax/after-tax basis, and various participant tax rates) were variable and could 
have a range of results from a 15 percent savings to a five percent additional cost.82 
                                                                                                                                                 
77 Ibid. 
78 Everett Pyatt. Statement before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Ways and Means 
Committee on the Navy’s TAKX Program. 28 February 1983.  
79 Ibid, 2-3. 
80 Ibid, 3. 
81 Ibid, 3. 
82 Ibid, 7. 
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o The time charter would also be a “true” or “guideline” lease under IRS 
rules rather than a service contract, which meant that investors would not be eligible for 
the ITC.  As a result, the Navy’s capital hire payments would be increased to compensate 
the investor for the tax benefit loss. 
o In regard to the legal fees that were subject to Senator Metzenbaum’s 
angst, Mr. Pyatt emphasized that legal fees associated with charter and build contracts 
were common and assured Congress that “[n]o legal expenses incurred in connection 
with lawsuits, actions, disputes or similar proceedings in which the Government is an 
adverse party may be included in the Basic Capitalized Costs[; however,] [t] he fees may 
be adjusted to reflect actual costs, but cannot exceed the amount proposed by the 
offeror.”83 
 
• March 18, 1983 – Letter from Charles B. Rangel, Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Ways and Means Committee, sent to the 
SECNAV with further questions regarding the TAKX/T-5 Program.  SECNAV 
responded with answers to each question the same day.84  Below is a summary of the 
answers (those not previously discussed) found in the SECNAV’s response document:85 
o All payments will be made out of the NIF. 
o The Time Charter provides that if the Navy fails to exercise an option at 
the end of each five-year period then: 
 The Owners may keep the ships and the Navy has no obligation to 
pay any amount; 
                                                 
83 Ibid, 10. 
84 How the SECNAV was able to respond the same day is unclear.  The SECNAV’s responses were 
attached to Congressman Rangel’s letter—both documents were dated “March 18, 1983.” 
85 Charles Rangel. Letter to the Honorable John F. Lehman Jr. regarding Federal leasing practices. 18 
March 1983. The responses to the Committee’s questions were dated March 18, 1983, and were 
attached to Chairman Rangel’s letter to the SECNAV. The documents themselves were gathered from 
AGL’s archives. Although the authors have not directly authenticated the response’s source, the 
answers to the Committee’s questions are in-line with all other data gathered on the MPS/T-5 Program. 
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 The Owners may sell the ships and the Navy is obligated to pay the 
deficiency, if any, between the sale price and agreed termination value schedule; 
 The Navy has the right up to five days prior to the termination date 
and sale to rescind its termination notice and continue the charter; or 
 The Navy has the option of purchasing the ships at the then current 
fair market value but not less that the termination value.86 
o Assumed residual value at the end of the lease was 20 percent, based on a 
$184 million or $66 million dollar capitalized cost for the TAKX and T-5 vessels, 
respectively. 
 
• March 25, 1983 – AGL issued an analysis of the JCT’s report on the Tax 
Aspects of the TAKX MPS Program and other concerns.87  AGL offered the following 
information in rebuttal to the JCT’s February 15, 1983, report—all conclusions are based 
on AGL’s own analyses: 
o A representative TAKX ship (i.e., Maersk Vessel Number Three) was 
used in AGL’s report. 
o The $50.1 million present value difference between the AGL and JCT 
analyses centered on four key areas: methodology, treatment of residual value, 
recognition versus non-recognition of transactional costs, and rounding and discounting. 
Each will be discussed below:88 
• Methodology ($39.7 million difference) 
- AGL measured all Treasury cash inflows and outflows and 
compared the build and charter program to a cash purchase.  JCT assumed 100 percent 
                                                 
86 Ibid. 
87 Analysis of the Report by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation Regarding Tax Aspects of 
the TAKX Maritime Prepositioning Ship Program and Other Concerns. Argent Group, Ltd. 25 March 
1983. Expressed at a hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Committee on Ways and 
Means on February 28, 1983. 
88 Ibid. 
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Treasury debt financing for a direct purchase and concluded that it was unnecessary to 
count the income taxes realized from the debt portion of the lease. 
- As previously stated in the JCT report on February 15, 
1983, JCT did not consider the cash inflow from income taxes the debt lender would pay 
as the borrower makes his debt payments because the Government’s use of a pre-tax 
method of accounting coupled with the Treasury cash inflows that result from a Treasury-
financed purchase would negate one another, making the net Treasury effect zero. 
- JCT cited AGL for “double-counting” by crediting the 
Lender’s cash inflows from the lease but not counting similar Treasury cash inflows from 
financing a purchase.89  AGL denied double counting because it assumed that the 
Government would pay cash to acquire the vessels in a direct purchase instead of using 
100 percent Treasury debt financing.  A cash purchase results in no Treasury cash 
inflows from taxes on interest income, since there would be no lender to receive the 
interest income. 
- JCT assumed a pre-tax discount rate; AGL did not.  AGL 
used a ten percent discount rate, but, in addition, conducted a discount sensitivity analysis 
that used discount rates from five percent to 14 percent—the long-term debt rate at that 
time was approximately 12 percent.  AGL also stated that entities that purchased 
Treasury obligations during this period had an approximate overall tax rate of 12-15 
percent, and concluded that the after-tax equivalent of a 12 percent Treasury bond was 
10.2 percent—near the ten percent discount rated used by AGL in its analyses.90 
- JCT treated the debt portion of the leveraged lease and the 
debt portion of a long-term Treasury bond as equivalent.  AGL argued that the 
marketplace does not see them as equivalent because purchasers of each security have 
different economic profiles, and, thus, would have different after-tax returns. 
                                                 
89 United States Joint Committee on Taxation. Tax Aspects of Federal Leasing Arrangements. 15 
February 1983, 21. 
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• Residual Value Treatment ($5.1 million difference) 
- JCT assumed the net present value cost at the end of a 25-
year charter was $5.1 million, which equated to a $108.9 million future value—or, 
approximately 60 percent of the ship’s cost.  AGL dismissed JCT’s assumption as “too 
speculative to be used as the best estimate of what the Navy would be required to pay to 
purchase the ship in 25 years.”91  AGL assumed a zero percent residual value since any 
future salvage value would be minimal in a present-value sense.  This assumption 
notwithstanding, AGL also performed an analysis using a 20 percent residual value, 
which equated to a $1.7 million present value cost.  Given this new residual value 
assumption, AGL’s analysis showed a $27.6 million cost advantage to charter as opposed 
to JCT’s $17.4 million purchasing cost advantage.92 
• Recognition or Non-recognition of Transactional Costs ($4.2 
million difference) 
- JCT considered the transactional costs associated with 
leasing to be $4.2 million more than if the vessels were purchased.  AGL disagreed.  
AGL argued that a Government purchase would involve its own unique costs and would 
avoid potential construction overruns, the net effect of which would negate any 
purchasing cost savings over a charter transaction. 
• Rounding and Discounting ($1.1 million difference): As the sub-
title suggests, a $1.1 million discrepancy in the rounding calculations and present value 
analyses existed between JCT and AGL. 
o Tax Considerations 
• JCT and AGL agreed that the two most important issues 
surrounding the LvP analysis were (1) whether the Lessor/Owner would be treated as the 
                                                                                                                                                 
90 Analysis of the Report by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation Regarding Tax Aspects of 
the TAKX Maritime Prepositioning Ship Program and Other Concerns. Argent Group, Ltd. 25 March 
1983, 6. Expressed at a hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Committee on Ways and 
Means on February 28, 1983. 
91 Ibid, 8. 
92 Ibid, 8. 
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owner of the ship for tax purposes and (2) whether the Navy’s Time Charter is a usage 
charter rather than a service charter.  The former would make the ITC unavailable to the 
Lessor, and, subsequently, increase the Navy’s charter payments. 
• In regard to Federal tax ownership, JCT stated that “[u]nder the 
TAKX arrangement, the Navy bears significant risks, which raises questions as to 
whether the shipowner will in fact be treated as the owner for Federal tax purposes and, 
thus, whether any of the assumed tax benefits will be available.”93  AGL argued that 
similar transactions involving time charters (e.g., 1972 charter and build arrangement for 
nine tanker ships) involved the same risks and should not impact the tax benefits of the 
Deal; neither should it impact the “true lease” nature of the contract.94 
• In regard to the usage versus service contract disagreement, the 
JCT stated that 
[t]he TAKX charter arrangement raises several issues relevant to the 
determination of whether the investment credit will be available to the 
Shipowner.  The allocation of rights and duties among the parties to the 
Time Charter and the purpose for which the TAKX ship is required by the 
Navy may distinguish the TAKX charter arrangement from the cases that 
have been considered by the Internal Revenue Service and the Court of 
Claim [sic] under the service contract exception.95 
 
• AGL cited a series of private IRS rulings dating back to 1970 
dealing with transactions similar in structure to the TAXK Program that ruled in favor of 
a service contract (i.e., the ITC was available).96 
                                                 
93 United States Joint Committee on Taxation. Tax Aspects of Federal Leasing Arrangements. 15 
February 1983, 2.  
94 Analysis of the Report by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation Regarding Tax Aspects of 
the TAKX Maritime Prepositioning Ship Program and Other Concerns. Argent Group Ltd. 25 March 
1983, 12. Expressed at a hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Committee on Ways 
and Means on February 28, 1983. 
95 Ibid, 15-16. 
96 Ibid, B-1 through B-4. 
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• In the absence of the ITC, AGL concluded that the Navy’s charter 
hire payment would increase by $2.4 million and would decrease the chartering cost 
advantage to $29.5 million.  In addition, NTCG, including all cash inflows to and from 
the Treasury, would increase to $34.6 million.97 
 
• June 8, 1983 – John E. Chapoton, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Tax 
Policy), testified before the House Ways and Means Committee. 
o Discussed H.R. 3110, the Governmental Leasing Act of 1983, which 
would deny certain tax incentives for property used by Governments and other tax-
exempt entities.98 
o The Treasury Department supported the Bill as it applied to property used 
by domestic entities and foreign Governments. 
 
• June 28, 1983 – USCGEN (a.k.a. GAO) issued an analytical report on 
DoD’s use of long-term capital leases.99 
o GAO recommended that Congress pass legislation to prevent DoD from 
entering into long-term leases without Congressional analysis and authorization.100 
o GAO assumed AGL used constant dollars when discounting instead of 
using current dollars (AGL rebutted this assumption and stated that its studies used 
current dollars). 
o GAO alleged, using the JCT’s methodology and assumptions, that its and 
the JCT’s analyses demonstrated true LvP costs.  Both GAO and JCT used a pre-tax 
methodology, which considered all tax outflows from the Treasury but only a portion of 
                                                 
97 Ibid, 14-15. 
98 H.R. 3110 was introduced by Congressman James J. Pickle and was known as the “Pickle Bill.” 
99 United States Comptroller General. Improved Analysis Needed to Evaluate DoD’s Proposed Long-
Term Leases of Capital Equipment. 28 Jun 1983. (OSD Case No. 6301). 
100 Ibid, 19.  Section 303 of the fiscal year 1983 Defense Authorization Act required the Navy to 
notify the House and Senate Appropriations and Armed Services Committees prior to entering long-
term leases (see Public Law 97-252, Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1983), but, as the 
Comptroller General points out, this requirement would not apply to any future long-term leases. 
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the inflows (i.e., GAO/JCT did not consider the additional revenue generated by the debt-
portion of the financing arrangement—the taxable interest income paid to the Lessor 
which would create a Treasury inflow). 
o The differences between the after-tax methodology and assumptions used 
by AGL, C&L and the S&I Staff, and the pre-tax methodology and assumptions of the 
JCT and the GAO, are integrated into AGL’s March 25, 1983, analysis of the JCT 
report.101 
 
• November 1983 – IDA published its revised report on the LvP of Naval 
auxiliary ships.102  Although this report expanded the ideas of the February 1983 IDA 
report, the general conclusion that leasing was more cost effective than purchasing 
remained valid. 
 
Although the timeline continues into 1984 and beyond, the major controversy 
surrounding the LvP decision and related analyses by various independent groups was 
largely complete by the end of 1983.  In sum, the Deal created an analytical chasm 
between two main players: GAO and the Navy.  The Navy, who used AGL’s analysis as 
support, advocated leasing as the most cost-effective option; GAO, on the other hand, 
used the JCT’s analysis to support its opinion that purchasing was the more cost-effective 
option.  Table 6 summarizes these parties’ methodology, assumptions and conclusions in 
regard to the three main contentious issues: (1) How to deal with tax benefits; (2) How to 
deal with the discount rate; and (3) How to deal with the residual value. 
                                                 
101 AGL, C&L, S&I and the IDA all used similar methodologies and assumptions to conclude that 
leasing would be more cost-effective than a direct purchase.  On the contrary, the JCT and GAO 
reached the opposite conclusion using different methodologies and assumptions.  Hereafter, the authors 
will merge these players into two LvP analytical groups: Navy (leasing advocate) and GAO 
(purchasing advocate). 
102 Paul Munyon and John Wells. Institute for Defense Analyses. Alternative Methods for the 
Analysis of Lease/Purchase Options in Naval Auxiliary Ship Acquisition. November 1983. (IDA Paper 
P-1665 (Revised)). 
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Table 6. Navy and AGL vs. GAO and JCT: Methodology, Assumptions and 
Conclusion Controversies of the 1982-83 Deal103 
 




Measured all Treasury cash 
inflows and outflows as the 
net total cost to the 
Government.  All purchases 
were to be made with cash. 
The cash outflows represent 
the Treasury’s revenue loss 
from the Lessor’s accelerated 
depreciation tax benefits and 
cash inflows are the revenue 
gains from taxes payable on 
income resulting from the 
charter transactions.  
 
Measured all Treasury cash 
outflows, but not all the 
inflows.  All purchases were 
to be made using 100% 
Treasury debt financing.  
Cash outflows represent the 
Treasury’s revenue loss from 
the Lessor’s accelerated 
depreciation tax benefits. 
GAO/JCT concluded that it 
was unnecessary to count 
interest income from the debt 
because the Government’s 
pre-tax method of accounting 
did not require it to be 
counted. 
Discount Rate 
Assumed an after-tax 
discount rate of 10.25% (5% 
semi-annually). A 10% 
discount rate was prescribed 
by OMB Circulars A-76, A-
94 and by the DoD Cost 
Comparison Handbook (DoD 
Assumed a pre-tax discount 
rate of 10.25% (5% semi-
annually).  The Navy 
instructed all contract bidders 
to use this rate in their 
submissions (See Amended 
Solicitation Number N00024-
                                                 
103 Analysis of the Report by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation Regarding Tax Aspects of 
the TAKX Maritime Prepositioning Ship Program and Other Concerns. Argent Group Ltd. 25 March 
1983.  Data compiled by authors from AGL’s analysis of the JCT report. 
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Instruction 7041.3). AGL 
also conducted a discount 
rate sensitivity analysis with 
rates ranging from 5-14%. 
Any discount rate above 
7.12% (TAKX) and 6.38% 
(T-5) would result in leasing 




Initially assumed to be 0% 
because the Navy would 
“expend” most of the ship’s 
value during its 20-25 year 
lease. The discounted NPV 
value of any remaining 
salvage value would be 
negligible. A 20% residual 
value was eventually used as 
a realistic compromise. 
Assumed the NPV cost at the 
end of a 25-year charter was 
$5.1 million, which equates to 
a 60% residual value in 
current year dollars. 
Conclusions 
(all values in 
NPV)104 
TAKX 
NTCG for leasing: $157.33 
million compared to a 
purchase cost of $184.01 
million. 
 
NTCG for leasing: $199 
million compared to a 
purchase cost of $178.2 
million. 
                                                 
104 TAKX conclusions based on a representative ship: Maersk Vessel Number Three.  T-5 
conclusions based on Shipholdings Vessel Number Three. 
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T-5 
NTCG for leasing: $53.59 
million compared to a 
purchase cost of $66 million. 
The T-5 Program was not 
specifically analyzed by the 
GAO/JCT, but given its 
methodology and 
assumptions, leasing the T-5 




C. SPECIAL LEGISLATION  
 
 The special legislation enacted to assist the Navy in meeting its contractual 
obligations under the Deal are as follows: 
• Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1983 (P.L. 98-63): Congress granted 
the Navy authority to proceed with the MPS/T-5 Deal in the absence of an appropriation 
covering the total termination liability of the lease agreements.105 
• Appropriations Act of 1985 (P.L. 98-473): Congress provided the Navy 
with additional contract authority, which allowed the Navy to proceed with the Deal in 
the absence of an appropriation or existing unobligated balance sufficient to cover the 
total lease payments for all five years of the five-year base period.106 
Under the aforementioned appropriation acts from 1983 and 1985, Congress 
required the Navy to record annually against its industrial fund an amount equal to the 
Deal’s estimated lease payments for the then current lease year.  With respect to 
termination liability, Congress required the Navy to record against its then current fiscal 
year Operation and Maintenance appropriation, an amount equal to ten percent of the 
gross termination costs for failure to renew the leases.  Without this specific 
authorization, the Navy would have been required to record the full amount of the gross 
                                                 
105 United States General Accounting Office. Defense Acquisitions: Historical Analyses of Navy Ship 
Leases. June 1999. (Report No. GAO/NSIAD-99-125), 7. 
106 Ibid. 
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termination costs as well as the full amount of the estimated lease payments for the first 
five-year lease base period (the highest termination values for the MPS/T-5 Program 
occurred during the first five years.  The termination liability for failing to renew the 
lease after this period was estimated to be 128.1 percent of the Lessor’s cost to acquire 
the ship).107  See Appendix C for a sample MPS/T-5 termination value schedule based on 
Maersk and Shipholdings Vessel Number Three. 
D. CAPITAL HIRE COMPONENT OF LEASES  
In an effort to avoid the up-front procurement costs associated with a purchase, 
the Navy chose instead to lease the MPS/T-5 vessels.  By leasing, the Navy spread its 
payments over a longer period of time, which eliminated a large initial procurement 
obligation.  Through the use of the NIF, the Navy preserved procurement funds for higher 
priority combat vessels, allowing it to acquire mission-essential combat and non-combat-
related vessels.  In addition, the Deal permitted the use of commercial ABS specifications 
which allegedly saved taxpayers over $35 million per vessel.108 
Further, the Navy was not required to make any payments on the vessel until it 
found the vessel’s construction to be fully acceptable.  Upon acceptance, the capital hire 
rates were adjusted to reflect the actual debt and equity financing rates and the Navy 
would begin its series of bi-annual capital hire payments—paid on the 15th of January and 
July—for the duration of the contract.  Once the rates were adjusted, the Navy’s capital 
hire rates and termination values were fixed for the entire charter period.109  The capital 
hire rate110 consisted of the debt and equity financing provided by the Lender and the 
Lessor plus their required rate of return (i.e., the amount of ‘return’ to Equity Investors).  
                                                 
107 Ibid. 
108 Everett Pyatt. Statement before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Ways and Means 
Committee on the Navy’s TAKX Program. 28 February 1983, 2-3. 
109 See Appendix C for the capital hire rates and termination value schedules for Maersk Vessel 
Number Three (PFC JAMES ANDERSON) and Shipholdings Vessel Number Three (SAMUEL L. 
COBB). 
110 The Navy’s total bi-annual lease payments consisted of both capital hire and operating hire. 
Operating hire, the payment made to compensate the vessel’s operator for services rendered, would be 
payable regardless of the acquisition method and, thus, has no incremental effect on the capital hire 
analysis.  
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Again, this payment was made on a “hell or high water” basis, meaning that the payments 
were unconditional. 
The MPS leases were five-year contracts with four 5-year options totaling 25 
years; the T-5 vessels were five-year contracts with three 5-year options totaling 20 years.  
If the Navy failed to exercise any of the renewal options or terminated for convenience 
after the initial five-year period, the vessel being terminated would be sold and the Navy 
would pay any difference between the selling price and the pre-determined termination 
value—a value designed to repay the debt and equity participants for their investment 
plus their required return up to the termination date. 
Further, all 18 contracts had purchase options to be exercised by the Navy at any 
time during the contract.  The Navy could, at its option, purchase the vessels at the higher 
of termination or market value.  Termination values were significant in the early years of 
the lease (up to 125 percent of the ship’s value) to ensure the investors received their 
required rate of return regardless of the Navy’s decision to continue the contract.  Either 
way, the Navy bore the liability and subsequent risk.  This scenario, however, was (and 
is) no different than one would expect in the commercial sector. 
One highly controversial benefit of leasing, which lowered the Navy’s capital hire 
payment, was the “pass-though” of Lessor tax benefits.  The Government, as a non-
taxable entity, was ineligible for tax benefits in connection with the Deal.  However, one 
of the major benefits of investing in the MPS/T-5 Program from an Owner-Participant 
(i.e., Lessor) perspective was his ability to claim accelerated depreciation.  The vessel’s 
entire capitalized cost would be depreciated over a five-year period, resulting in 
significant Lessor tax savings.  An appreciable portion of these savings was calculated 
into the Navy’s capital hire payment, which resulted in lower lease payments. 
Potential equity investors were also attracted to the ITC as an additional tax 
benefit, but a December 10, 1984, IRS ruling declared the time charter a ‘usage’ vice a 
‘service contract,’ making the ITC unavailable.111  As a result, the pre-negotiated capital 
hire provisions increased the capital hire payments. 
                                                 
111 The IRS issued a 143-page private letter ruling on December 10, 1984, that the time charter was a 
true lease for tax purposes and, thus, the investment tax credit would not be available (See Forman, 
Jonathan. “Tax Considerations in Renting A Navy.” Tax Notes, 25 March 1985, 1193. 
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As Appendix C illustrates, no capital hire payments were made until the Navy 
accepted delivery of the vessel.  At that point, the capital hire payments began and were 
modest during the first five years of the contract.  These first payments were lower due to 
the Lessor’s accelerated depreciation tax benefit.  In the second five-year renewal period, 
however, the capital hire payments began to increase, and continued to do so at each five-
year contract renewal.  Higher lease payments later in the contract benefited the Navy—
and the Government as a whole—due to the time value of money.  In short, the later and 
greater the capital hire payments, the more present value savings realized by the Navy 
relative to higher capital hire payments made early in the leasing period.  The present 
value savings increases with the discount rate, making larger capital hire payments 
occurring later in the contract period lower in a net present value context. 
E. PURCHASE OF THE T-5 TANKERS 
 In early 2001, MSC realized it was quickly approaching a decision point with 
regard to the disposition of its five leased T-5 tankers.  MSC planned to charter each 
tanker for 20 years following each vessel’s delivery—a process that began June 1985 and 
ended April 1986.  The last of the twenty-year leases would end April 2006, leaving 
MSC with an unfilled tanker requirement.  It was this set of circumstances that prompted 
MSC to investigate possible replacement alternatives.  Through its 2001 study titled T-5 
Tankers: Replacement Alternatives, MSC analyzed four T-5 tanker alternatives:112 
• Allow the charters to expire and enter into new charters in 2005; 
• Begin the process of building replacement ships; 
• Negotiate an extension contract; or 
• Exercise the purchase option. 
 
Of the four alternatives, MSC decided to purchase four of the five T-5 tankers.  
Four of the tankers (Shipholdings Numbers One, Three, Four and Five) were purchased 
on January 15, 2003, two for $25 million and two for $23 million.  The fifth tanker 
(Shipholdings Number Two - Gus W. Darnell) was not purchased because an equitable 
                                                 
112 Military Sealift Command. T-5 Tankers: Replacement Alternatives. May 2001, 16. 
 59
price could not be struck between MSC and the Equity Owners. 
 The choice to eventually exercise the option to purchase the T-5 tankers was 
reached only after careful consideration.  Specifically, the financial aspects of each 
alternative were evaluated, which considered the time value of money, operating 
expenses, insurance, and any penalties that may have applied at the time of purchase.  A 
summary comparison regarding the alternative selection process follows: 
1. Allow Charter to Expire & Enter into New Charter 
 One solution would have been to do nothing and allow the charters to expire and 
then enter into new charters.  MSC’s only requirement would have been to give the 
owners 120 days notice before re-delivery of the vessels and then return the vessels to a 
US port where they would have undergone a final inspection to ensure they were in good 
operating condition.  Upon passing their inspection, the tankers would have entered 
commercial service as determined by their owners.   
 Unfortunately, this alternative would have resulted in MSC reverting to the open 
market to fill the tanker requirement.  During the 1980s, when the T-5 tankers were built, 
an abundance of tankers existed.  However, several circumstances changed the tanker 
availability.  The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, passed in the shadow of the Exxon Valdez 
disaster, required that any tanker built after 1990 be double-hulled.  In addition, the Act 
slowly phased-out all existing single-hulled tankers; fortunately, the T-5 tankers were 
double-hulled.  However, the shipbuilding industry has not kept pace by building new 
tankers to replace the phased-out, single-hulled tankers, which has resulted in a shortage 
of double-hulled tankers. 
 In addition, the Jones Act, passed in 1917, required all cargo, including oil 
products be 1) moved between US ports, 2) carried in ships which were manufactured in 
the US, 3) 75 percent ownership by US parties, and 4) crewed by American citizens.  
This requirement, which is often referred to as “Jones Act vessels,” further reduces the 
quantity of available tankers because it eliminated the possibility of using foreign 
carriers. 
 Thus, if MSC chose to charter new tankers it would be required to enter the US 
commercial tanker market, which was experiencing a short supply of Jones Act tankers 
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and, consequently, charging premium rates for tanker leases.  At the time of its tanker 
report, MSC estimated daily tanker lease rates in the shrinking US commercial market 
ranged from $20,000 to $30,000 per day in 2001.113  In its analysis of alternatives, MSC 
created a spreadsheet, reproduced in Table 7 below, which calculated the total cost of the 
T-5 Program from January 2002 through 2015, using daily charter prices in 2001 dollars. 
 










$25,000 $892 $617 
30,000 1,014 692 
35,000 1,137 766 
40,000 1,259 841 
 
Thus, Table 7 shows the cost of letting the charters expire and then entering into 
the US open market to find either new or used tankers to charter.  Before any real 
conclusions can be drawn, however, a comparison of the other options and their costs 
must be made. 
2. Build Replacement Tankers 
The alternative to build replacement tankers was the most expensive option.  This 
option required the most coordination, and presented the highest level of urgency, since 
MSC estimated that it would take three years, on average, to build a tanker.  This 
alternative would have required MSC to begin the construction process immediately if it 
wanted to replace the tanker fleet before lease expiration.  In addition, MSC found it 
difficult to determine the exact cost of a new tanker; however, it did estimate the cost to 
                                                 
113 Ibid, 8. 
114 Ibid. 
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be between $70 to $90 million if built in 2005.  Finally, regardless of whether MSC chose 
to procure the tankers or charter them, MSC would have to endure a lengthy 
Congressional approval process. 
Table 8 reveals the program costs for the completion of the T-5 tanker charters 
and the procurement of five new T-5 tankers.  It also assumes that the ships take three 
years to build and have outlays spread throughout the three years.  Residual values are 
also considered. 
 
Table 8. Replacement Tanker Costs115 
 








$70 $833 $685 
75 846 701 
80 860 717 
85 874 733 
 
Table 8 also shows the cost of letting the charters expire and the cost of a new 
build and charter program.  Since the cost of future construction is difficult to ascertain, 
this choice is the most expensive and bears the most risk. 
3. Negotiate an Extension 
The original T-5 charters did not contain an extension provision, but it is possible 
that one could have been negotiated.  There are two major issues with this alternative: 
Securing Congressional approval and forecasting the future cost of the charter.  Congress 
would want to know the forecasted amount before it would approve the charter extension, 
and MSC would not be able to negotiate the charter extension until it had Congressional 
                                                 
115 Ibid, 10. 
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approval.  Furthermore, since the 1980s, laws and regulations have changed and MSC 
would now have to accomplish several measures before the charters could be extended: 
Obtain OMB approval, prepare a LvP analysis for the Secretary of Defense, acquire 
Congressional authority for a long-term lease, and secure Congressional or OMB special 
budgetary authority. 
Provided MSC was able to meet all rules and regulations, MSC could then enter 
into negotiation with the tankers’ equity owners.  While estimates vary, MSC estimated 
the extended leases would range from $7,000 to $10,000 per day.  Table 9 summarizes 
this option. 
Table 9. Negotiated Extension of Tanker Costs116 
 
New Capital 







$7,000 $843 $588 
8,000 861 600 
9,000 880 611 
10,000 898 623 
 
Table 9 shows the cost of continuing the leases and then negotiating an extension 
at the end of the original lease.  Again, this option must be compared with the other 
options before reaching a conclusion. 
4. Purchase the Tankers 
 The final and most cost effective alternative was to exercise the T-5 purchase 
options and procure all five tankers.  During the original charter negotiations MSC 
negotiated the option to purchase the tankers on any capital hire payment date (January or 
July 15 of each contract year).  MSC’s only obligation was to notify the contractors and 
ship owners no less than 140 days before the capital hire payment dates. 
                                                 
116 Ibid, 11. 
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 The price MSC would pay for the ships was based on the greater of either the 
termination value of the charter or the current fair market value price.  The termination 
value of the tankers was predetermined based on the capital hire payments in the 1980s 
and has not changed.117  The fair market value was determined based on a market survey.  
MSC’s analysis, as illustrated in Figure 10, shows a point on the graph (Point A) where 
the market value and the termination value are equal.  In theory, all things being equal, 
this location is the most cost effective point—i.e., where the vessels should be purchased 









































Figure 10. Termination & Projected Market Values118 
 
However, there are several other factors that need to be considered.  MSC realized 
an estimated additional $2,600 daily cost under its current contract than it would with a 
competitive contract, due to the operating rate being set in the early 1980s.  In addition, 
MSC paid $1,760 per day to insure each ship.  These amounts would not be paid if MSC 
purchased the vessels.  
These two factors favor purchasing the ships earlier than the graph in Figure 10 
depicts due to the insurance cost savings.  On the other hand, there are several 
                                                 
117 See termination values in Appendix C. 
118 Military Sealift Command. T-5 Tankers: Replacement Alternatives. May 2001, 13. 
A
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termination costs that MSC might be required to pay depending on procurement timing.   
First, if MSC chose to exercise its option on any date other than the five-year 
option period date then MSC would pay a “termination for convenience” payment.  This 
payment pays for contract closing costs, any unallocated overhead, lease cancellation, 
and any other unforeseen administrative expenses.   
Second, other termination costs included full payment of the Government bonds 
issued by the FFB to the Deal’s special purpose entities.  These bonds were not callable--
the FFB required that if the bonds were redeemed early, they must be redeemed at an 
equivalent bond market price, not their face value.  Thus, if the rate of return on like-term 
bonds was the same or higher than the rate of return on the bonds issued to finance the 
tankers, the FFB would consider the deal a wash.  However, if the rate of return on the 
like-term bonds was lower, a premium called a “breakage fee,” would have to be paid. 
Taking all these factors into consideration, MSC estimated the value of the 
procurement as presented in Table 10.  This table shows the costs of purchasing the 
tankers outright and is by far the most cost effective choice when compared to the other 
alternatives.  Table 10 assumes the simultaneous purchase of all five tankers (to save on 
transaction costs), and combines the savings received from all cancelled insurance 
payments, reduced operating costs and termination expenses. 
 
Table 10. Purchase Cost of Five Tankers119 
 
Buy All Ships 







2002 $587 $439 
2003 600 446 
2004 616 457 
2005 648 480 
 
                                                 
119 Ibid, 14. 
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5. Comparison of Alternatives 
 A comparison of the four alternatives reveals the T-5 tanker purchase as the most 
cost effective.  MSC’s graph, reproduced in Figure 11, validates this selection.  However, 
there are other factors not represented in this chart that provided benefits by purchasing 
the vessels.  These purchases involved virtually no effort: it was merely a factor of 
exercising a preexisting option and securing the funding.  Any of the other three options 
would have required leasing approval through the Secretary of Defense, Congress, and 



















Figure 11. Comparison of Alternatives120 
 
 Another purchasing benefit was no lapse in service.  One day the vessels belonged 
to special purpose Equity Owners and the next day they belonged to the Navy.  The only 
                                                 
120 Ibid, 15. 
$Millions(PV) 
Assumptions:  
  Baseline … Decreasing Charter Rate  
  Build  …… Decreasing Building Price 
  Extend ..… Decreasing Capital Hire 
  Buy-out … Earlier Purchase Date    
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other option that would have provided this continuous level of service would have been 
to extend the leases.  The procurement alternative also avoided the three-year 
construction waiting period, which would have been required if replacement tankers had 
been built. 
F. FUTURE OF THE GLOBAL MARITIME PREPOSITION FORCE SHIPS 
 As the 25-year lease period for the ships of the MPS Program draws to a close 
during this first decade of the 21st Century, the Navy will need to purchase the 13 vessels 
of the current Global MPF.  But is the Global MPF as it exists today a viable concept for 
the future?  In 1997, the USMC articulated a new operational doctrine for forward 
deployment of its forces called Operational Movement From The Sea (OMFTS), which 
involves sea basing USMC logistic support.  This doctrine assumes that land-based 
facilities may not be available for traditional off-loading of USMC equipment by MPF 
ships.  OMFTS is helping drive the creation of a new and improved MPF fleet, a concept 
known as MPF (Future). 
 The MPF (Future) concept will enable the USMC to conduct sea-based operations 
involving four capabilities, which the current MPF cannot meet: 1) at-sea phased arrival 
and assembly of Expeditionary Forces, 2) Expeditionary Strike Group Interoperability, 3) 
sea-based sustainment of Expeditionary Forces, and 4) at-sea reconstitution and 
redeployment of the Expeditionary Force.121  
 Figure 12 contains an artist’s rendition of a proposed MPF (F) ship depicting a 
significant aviation capability, as well as a depiction of a new requirement, the Integrated 
Landing Platform (ILP) Concept, which will allow a MPF (F) ship to off-load at sea to a 
Landing Craft Air-Cushioned (LCAC) vehicle.  
                                                 
121 Program Executive Office Ships.  
http://peoships.crane.navy.mil/pms325/futureships/MPF(F)/MPF.htm (accessed 10 November 2004). 
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Figure 12. Artist’s Depiction of MPF (F) Ship and the ILP Concept122 
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IV. A SURVEY OF LEGISLATIVE, TAX & REGULATORY 
ISSUES 
A. EARLY 1980s ENVIRONMENT  
 The MPS/T-5 Deal resulted in a review of tax issues involved in long-term lease 
agreements entered into by US Government agencies.  When conducting contracting 
matters, all Government agencies must know and adhere to the provisions in the Anti-
Deficiency Act.  This Act, codified in 31 U.S.C. 1341, prohibits authorizing or incurring 
obligations or expenditures in excess of amounts available in an appropriation or fund 
unless authorized by law.  
 When the Navy entered the MPS/T5 tanker leases, it agreed to leases that would 
cover a five-year base period, renewable at 5-year intervals, with substantial termination 
costs for failure to renew each ship’s contract.  After the Navy entered the leases, it 
became concerned about the total amount it should record as a firm obligation in the 
Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) once the lease period started—which was a vital task given 
the NIF had limited working capital to support its activities.  At this time, Congress 
became concerned about the adequacy of the Navy’s budget authority to cover the long-
term obligations that would accrue from the leases.  The GAO concluded that once the 
Navy agreed to commence the lease, it must record the leases as firm obligations in an 
amount sufficient to cover the lease payments for the five-year base period plus the gross 
termination expenses should the leases not be renewed at the end of the five years.  If the 
NIF did not have an existing unobligated balance sufficient to cover these costs at the 
time of the delivery of the vessels, it would be in violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act.  
 Other tax issues that were considered in evaluating LvP options were the Lessor’s 
(i.e., Shipowner’s) special tax benefits, such as accelerated depreciation of the ship’s cost 
and deductions on interest payments, which lowered the Shipowner’s tax payments.  The 
Shipowners passed these benefits to the Navy in the form of lower lease payments, 
thereby making the lease option more attractive. 
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 In addition, certain economic assumptions were used in the absence of clear 
guidance: the Navy could acquire these ships without a large up-front obligation of 
procurement funds.  No detailed or specific guidelines existed on how to conduct a LvP 
analysis in the early 1980s.  Three specific items figured prominently into the Navy’s 
economic calculation to lease these vessels: tax revenue/loss to the Government, residual 
value, and the discount rate.  In regard to tax revenue/loss, the Navy study reduced the 
total cost of the lease to the Government by the taxes that would be paid on interest 
income received by the lenders who financed a portion of the ship’s acquisition.  In 
regard to ship residual value, the Navy study assumed that the vessels would have no 
residual value at the end of their 25-year leases.123  In regard to the discount rate, the 
Navy used the ten percent rate prescribed by the OMB.  In general, the higher the 
discount rate, the more economical the leasing option becomes versus a purchase. 
B. CHANGES SINCE 1982 & CURRENT 2004 ENVIRONMENT 
 Congress passed the FY 1984 Department of Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 98-
94) in September 1983, which established a number of statutory conditions and 
requirements for entering into long-term leases.  These requirements, which have since 
been codified in 10 U.S.C. 2401, increase Congressional control over certain lease 
decisions, make lease decisions more transparent, and provide for the development of 
more detailed guidelines for conducting LvP comparisons.124 
In general, U.S.C. 2401 requires that: 
• DoD’s long-term leases or charters of vessels and aircraft, or leases or 
charters with substantial termination liabilities, be specifically authorized by law; 
• Notice of intent to issue a solicitation for such a lease or charter be given 
to the Committees on Armed Services and on Appropriations of the Senate and House of 
Representatives; 
• A detailed description of the terms of the lease and a justification for entering 
into the lease rather than purchase of the vessel be provided to Congress; 
                                                 
123 Ibid, 8. 
124 Ibid, 10. 
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• An analysis comparing the costs of leasing to those of purchasing be 
submitted to Congress with any request for authorization of such a lease; 
• Such analysis be evaluated by OMB and the Treasury Department; and 
• OMB and Treasury jointly issue guidelines for determining under what 
circumstances DoD may use lease arrangements rather than use direct procurement.125 
 These requirements, as listed in U.S.C. 2401, did not affect any lease or charter 
agreement entered prior to December 1, 1983, and, therefore, did not affect the 
acquisition of the MPS/T-5 vessels. 
 In 1984 the OMB and Treasury issued joint guidelines for DoD leases (Joint 
OMB and Treasury Guidelines to the Department of Defense Covering Lease or Charter 
Arrangements for Aircraft or Naval Vessels, published Oct. 31, 1984).  These guidelines 
required that any special tax benefits conveyed to the Shipowner be added to the cost of a 
lease in a LvP analysis.126 
 The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-369) modified tax laws and eliminated 
the benefits available to the owners of assets leased to Government entities. (Not 
retroactive to prior leases).127 
 The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-177) 
(as subsequently amended in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-33), which 
extended the discretionary spending caps to 2002), established statutory limits on Federal 
Government spending by creating spending caps on discretionary spending.  To track 
progress against and compliance with budget enforcement requirements and spending 
caps, budget scorekeeping guidelines have been established for capital leases, lease-
purchases, and operating leases.  If the Navy desired to enter today a similar lease 
agreement as arranged in 1982, it has to request up-front budget authority for the 
                                                 
125 Ibid, 10. 
126 Ibid, 12. 
127 Ibid, 11. 
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estimated present value of the Government’s total estimated legal obligations over the life 
of the contract.128  
 Additional guidance (Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of 
Federal Programs, OMB Circular A-94, Oct. 29, 1992) was issued by OMB in 1992 to 
prevent LvP analysis from understating the Government’s total cost of leasing.  This 
guidance, applied Government-wide, prescribes that analysis (1) should add special tax 
benefits to the cost of leasing, and (2) should not subtract the normal payment of taxes on 
the lessor’s income derived from the leases from the total lease costs.129 
 OMB Circular A-94 also addressed discount rate usage.  It prescribed that LvP 
analyses are to use discount rates that reflect the Treasury’s borrowing rate (OMB 
currently updates these rates annually).  Lower discount rates make leasing less attractive 
and higher discount rates make leasing more attractive.  
C. OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING LEASING  
 Aside from the Internal Revenue Service’s tax regulations and the historical and 
contemporary Congressional limitations imposed by our nation’s duly elected legislators, 
there are other reasons why leasing might be a better option than purchasing. 
 Leasing allows the Government to use an asset that has not yet been fully paid.  
This first option is desirable when funds are limited and there is a need to acquire 
additional assets above current procurement levels. 
 Second, leasing allows the Government to acquire an asset quicker than if it had 
to undergo a traditionally lengthy procurement process.  In general, the procurement 
process tends to be slow, due in part to the occasional wrangling among legislators whose 
constituent loyalties impart a desire to make the procurement as politically beneficial as 
possible. 
 Third, leasing allows the Government to spread expenditures over a longer period, 
which frees additional current monies for other procurement. 
                                                 
128 Ibid, 11. 
129 Ibid, 12. 
 73
 In the MPS/T-5 ship acquisition, leasing allowed the ships to be built using 
approved commercial specifications rather than military specifications.  This use resulted 
in minimal change orders, decreased work stoppages, and faster vessel completion times.  
Together, leasing resulted in greater cost savings over a purchase. 
 An expansion of other factors affecting leasing is discussed further in Chapter V: 
Leasing Recommendations. 
D. GEOPOLITICAL SUCCESS  
 In the late 1970s, MSC needed to acquire additional vessels to fulfill its strategic 
sealift support mission.  The post-Vietnam drawdown period found MSC using old 
WWII-era tankers to re-supply fuel to its many customers throughout the world.  The 
maximum life expectancy for many of these vessels approached its end, which signaled 
MSC to modernize its fleet.  
 The turn of the decade also found the US in a renewed arms race with the Soviet 
Union.  The Russian Navy strove to produce a large blue-water fleet to rival the US 
Navy.  The Soviets worked diligently to construct aircraft carriers, cruisers, submarines, 
as well as long-range bombers for its Air Force, equipped with long-range anti-ship 
cruise missile capabilities to defeat the US Navy’s open sea hegemony.  
 US interests were in peril elsewhere as well.  Instability in the Persian Gulf 
region, as implied by the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, and the resultant fuel cost crises to Americans, led the US to review its 
military capabilities and ability to meet these new threats.  When Ronald Reagan 
assumed the Presidency in 1981, an impressive build-up of US military forces began, 
which included as a goal, a 600-ship Navy. 
 It was in this political environment that MSC hoped to acquire five T-5 Champion 
Class replacement tankers to maintain its global refueling responsibilities.  It also found a 
need to acquire 13 cargo vessels with Lift-off/Lift-on (LO/LO) and Roll-on/Roll-off 
(RO/RO) capabilities to meet the requirements of a relatively new concept of operations: 
prepositioning USMC combat equipment at strategic port locations around the world.  
This new concept of operations was called the Maritime Preposition Force, which 
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evolved from a similarly titled Near Term Preposition Force established in the late 1970s 
at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean using older cargo vessels.  
 One can understand why MSC approached the acquisition of the MPS/T-5 vessels 
hoping to lease instead of purchase them—to do so would improve its chances of 
Congressional approval.  However, the Democratic-controlled Congress in early 1980 
was already busy dealing with the Republican Chief Executive’s other military proposals, 
especially the new and expensive Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).  The fact that 
acquiring merchant ships through leasing was a time-tested common practice made it 
reasonable for MSC to request permission to lease rather than purchase the 18 vessels. 
 One can reasonably argue that were it not for timely ship acquisition through the 
lease option—at that period in history—the US might have found itself in quite a 
different position in the world today.  The money that Congress saved in the early 1980s 
by not purchasing the MPS/T-5 vessels was used to fund the expansion of the Navy’s 
capital fleet, research SDI, and increase the overall size of the US military.  This focus 
helped maintain pressure on the Soviet Union to do the same, but due to an already 
strained economy, the Soviets were unable to compete, which, along with their internal 
strife, helped bring about its 1990 collapse. 
 As a result of the Deal, MPS and Sealift Tanker vessels were invaluable during 
major conflicts in the last decade of the twentieth and the first decade of the twenty-first 
centuries.  The capabilities and strategic positioning of the MPF vessels ensured the US 
and allies’ success in Operations Desert Storm/Desert Shield in 1990-1991, and 
demonstrated the ability to launch a quick counter-offensive in the new Global War 
against Terrorism during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001 and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. 
E. FINANCIAL  
 In addition to the aforementioned geopolitical issues, the Government and other 
participants in the Deal realized other financial benefits:130 
 
                                                 
130 Argent Group Ltd. Memorandum on the Success of MPS and T-5 Programs. 22 May 1986. 
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• The Navy avoided up-front procurement costs associated with purchasing; 
 
• By using approved commercial specifications rather than military 
specifications, the Navy allegedly saved over $35 million per vessel; 
 
• Due to the Deal’s termination values, the investors were guaranteed their 
required rate of return, even if the Navy decided to purchase the vessels early in the lease 
phase; 
 
• The Navy’s actual cost (i.e., the capital hire payments) were spread across 
the 25 or 20-year life span of the contract, freeing procurement dollars for high-priority 
items; and 
 
• The 13 MPS vessels were delivered at an average cost of $177.9 million, 
for a total program savings of $79.8 million; the five T-5 tankers were delivered at an 
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V. LEASING RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CAPITAL LEASING BY THE GOVERNMENT 
The current political environment and prevailing attitude toward capital leases has 
slowly moved from positive to negative.  During WWII, leasing was considered a viable 
method for temporarily procuring urgent assets.  In 1972, the Navy entered into a capital 
lease for nine T-2 tankers, which created very little controversy.  However, after the long-
term MPS/T-5 leasing deal, Congressional attitude toward leasing turned predominately 
negative and resulted in legislation that makes long-term capital leasing virtually 
impossible. 
While Congress has not provided official guidance on its opposition to capital 
leasing, our research suggests an anti-leasing bias.  On the surface it would appear that 
Congress does not favor long-term leasing because it reduces its budgetary control.  In a 
normal procurement process, Congress would authorize ship procurement and then 
appropriate 100 percent of the vessel’s construction funds.  In a capital lease program, 
however, the money is paid annually from the Operations and Maintenance - Navy 
(OM&N) fund.  While Congress does control the OM&N budget, it would have to factor 
the twenty years of future lease payments into that budget. 
Leasing also reduces the lengthy approval and procurement process—a process 
that gives Congressional members decisive input to the program, especially if it does not 
favor their constituents.  Capital leasing, however, does require approval from the 
Secretary of Defense and Congress, but the level of control is somewhat reduced when 
compared to the procurement process. 
Another opponent to leasing lies in the vast community of DoD procurement 
specialists.  The DoD spent millions of dollars and many years developing its corps of 
acquisition and contracting specialists.  However, leasing virtually bypasses the whole 
acquisition process and requires only a few contract specialists.  Thus, speculation 
dictates that the acquisition and contracting communities are protecting their job security 
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by not favoring leasing.  This argument also raises the question as to why the DoD does 
not employ leasing specialists.  Capital leases are currently treated on an ad hoc basis.  
Since no formal guidance exists on how to conduct a lease, the wheel must be reinvented 
each time a lease is considered. 
Regardless of the bias that currently exists toward leasing, there are certain times 
when the DoD should strongly consider capital leases. 
1. When Mission Critical and No Funding 
Since the end of the cold war the military has consistently experienced tight 
budget constraints.  During any budget year there are always requirements that go 
unfunded.  When requirements do go unfunded, the question that should be asked is 
“How mission critical is the requirement?”  If there is an urgent requirement that is 
mission critical then perhaps capital leasing is a viable option.  Capital leasing allows the 
Government to receive and use assets immediately, provided they are available, and it 
allows them to spread the cash outlays over the lease period rather than front-loading 100 
percent of the cost.  Thus, leasing provides the Government with an extremely powerful 
tool: providing financing alternatives that normally would not be available. 
2. When Leasing Provides Advantages That Procurement Does Not 
The unique properties of leasing can provide advantages that could never be 
achieved through a normal procurement process.  In a normal military procurement 
process, the requirements document spells out in great detail the operating characteristics 
and military specifications by which any piece of military equipment must be built.  This 
review normally happens even before Congress approves or appropriates procurement 
funds.  The military specifications often found in the requirements document are unique 
to the military because they generally require higher standards than commercially built 
items, and almost always cost more due to their unique features and requirements.  In the 
case of military assets, which normally operate in harm’s way, building to military 
specifications can ensure survivability. 
For MPS/T-5 vessels, their mission objective was to operate in a peaceful 
environment with the remote possibility of going into harm’s way.  Thus, the need for 
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ships built to military specifications was not needed.  However, the military’s 
requirements experience resides primarily in the area of military specifications.  Thus, 
regardless of whether or not the ships needed to be built to military specifications, 
precedence would dictate military specifications as the standard. 
In early 1982 when the MSC decided to lease the MPS/T-5 vessels rather than 
procuring them, it transferred MSC’s normal MPS/T-5 oversight role to ABS standards.  
ABS standards are used by private shipbuilding companies unless they are using military 
specifications, which tend to require higher standards than ABS.  Thus, by building the 
ships to ABS standards and leasing them to the Government, cost savings were passed to 
the Government in the form of lower lease payments.  However, if MSC had procured the 
vessels, they would have been built to military specifications as dictated in the 
requirements document, costing the military much more money. 
Leasing also provides other advantages besides reduced expenditures.  Since a 
commercial shipbuilding company built the vessels, the military was not allowed to 
intervene in the construction process.  The shipbuilding company was under a tight 
contract where delays and design changes were not allowed.  In fact, severe penalties 
would accompany late delivery of any vessel.  These factors motivated the shipbuilder to 
stay on schedule and ensure on-time delivery. 
In a normal military procurement where a ship is built to military specifications, 
there are often many delays and changes caused by military-initiated work order changes.  
These changes generally cost extra money and often place the project over-budget, 
which, in turn, increases Congressional oversight.  While it is arguable whether military 
intervention in a project actually adds value, it is well known—in the Supply community 
at least—that military intervention and subsequent change orders raises costs, produces 
delays, and draws Congressional attention.  Thus, the ability to avoid all these problems 
through leasing may be extremely beneficial in terms of cost, delivery, and mission. 
3. When the Procurement Process Needs to be Bypassed 
The procurement process certainly has its time and place in asset acquisition.  
When it comes to the acquisition of a major war-fighting platform such as the Joint Strike 
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Fighter, there is no better acquisition vehicle than the procurement process.  The process 
itself ensures that the platform requirements and specifications are mission-essential.  It 
also ensures the project is completely funded, and that Congress is fully aware at each 
stage of the program.  The Joint Strike Fighter program began in late 1995131 and was 
not awarded until April 2002.132  However, this award was a unique procurement to 
satisfy multiple mission needs by the aviation communities of several uniformed services.   
There are times, however, when a lengthy procurement process is not merited.  
For example, leasing should be considered as a viable option when the requirement can 
be filled with a commercial off the shelf (COTS) application (e.g., computers).  Since the 
COTS application has already been designed and built, the lengthy procurement process 
does not provide added value. 
It is also advantageous to bypass the lengthy procurement process when the 
requirement is mission-essential and there is not sufficient time for an extended 
procurement process.  Shortly after the terrorist events of 9-11, for example, there was a 
multitude of immediate security requirements.  One viable option for fulfilling these 
requirements would have been capital leases that contained termination clauses.  By 
using these financing vehicles, the Government could fulfill its requirements in a much 
shorter time and at reduced up-front outlays.  If the requirements eventually become 
obsolete, the Government could terminate the lease and pay any applicable termination 
fees—although paying the termination value is, in effect, paying off the asset’s cost. 
B. DESIRED LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENT 
To understand the desired, or ideal, legislative environment for leasing, we must 
first review the legislation that facilitated the MPS/T-5 Deal.  One of the first major 
issues was how to record the leases.  In January 1983, the USCGEN issued a report that 
required the Navy, upon receipt of each ship, to record the ship’s total cost for the five-
                                                 
131 Christopher Bolkcom. CRS Report For Congress, Joint Strike Fighter Program: Background, 
Status, and Issues. Library of Congress, February 15, 2002, CRS 2. 
132 John B. Larson. “News From: U.S. Congressman John B. Larson serving Connecticut’s First 
District.” http://www.house.gov/larson/pr_010416.htm (accessed November 11, 2004). 
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year base period plus the termination value, as if terminated at the end of the five-year 
period.  If this action had actually been implemented, the Navy would have obligated 
more money than it would have cost to purchase the ships.   
In the end, to avoid violating the Anti-Deficiency Act, Congress enacted special 
legislation which allowed the Navy to proceed with the leasing arrangement in the 
absence of an appropriation to cover the five-year lease payments and total termination 
value.  As a result, the Navy was only required to obligate one year’s worth of lease 
payments and ten percent of the ship’s termination value.  In effect, Congress took on the 
complete risk for the MPS/T-5 Program.  If circumstances called for early termination, 
Congress would have been required to appropriate the money and pay any remaining 
costs. 
1. Pay & Record as You Go 
One of the benefits of leasing in the commercial world is the ability to pay for the 
use of your leased equipment as you use it.  If the user of equipment was required to pay 
100 percent of the lease before he used the equipment, then there would be no reason to 
lease.  Instead, he would purchase the equipment with his own or borrowed funds.  The 
same concept applies to the Government.  If the Government requires its agencies to 
obligate the total payments for the first option period plus the termination value—which 
virtually equals or exceeds the cost of the total lease—then it will never make financial 
sense to lease.  Thus, in order to make leasing a viable option for the Government, special 
legislation needs to be passed that frames leasing as an annual obligation, allowing the 
Government to make lease payment over the life of the contract. 
2. Allow Accelerated Cost Recovery System Depreciation 
The Economic Recovery Act of 1981 allowed companies to realize their 
depreciation tax benefits over an accelerated time period.  This program, the Accelerated 
Cost Recovery System, allowed the Equity Owners of the MPS/T-5 vessels to completely 
depreciate their ships over a five-year period even though the vessels’ lives were 20 to 25 
years.  The advantage to the Equity Owners was that their taxable income in the early 
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years of the lease was lower than if the vessels had been depreciated over their service 
life, which lowered their tax bill to the IRS in the lease’s early years. 
In 1984, Congress passed the Deficit Reduction Act (P.L. 98-369), which 
modified tax laws and removed the ability for the Equity Owners to use the ACRS with 
respect to assets leased to tax-exempt entities such as the Government.  The Legislation 
reduced the impact of tax benefits by lengthening the period for tax depreciation to a 
period equal to 125 percent of the lease term.  While this Legislation was not retroactive, 
if the MPS vessels had been built after 1984, the depreciation would have been spread 
equally over 31.25 years.  Thus, any future leases by the Government would not be able 
to benefit from the favorable net present value benefits of the five-year depreciation.  
The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-369) actually discourages future 
Equity Owners from entering into a ship leasing arrangement, since it reduces their tax 
benefits.  Thus, if the military hopes to foster an environment where equity owners desire 
to lease to the military, Congress needs to re-institute the ability for equity owners to take 
accelerated depreciation over shorter time periods. 
3. Allow Investment Tax Credit 
In 1962 the IRS provided American businesses with the Investment Tax Credit in 
order to encourage the purchase of machinery and equipment, which would, in turn, 
stimulate the economy.  The ITC, which began at seven percent, was removed, and later 
reinstated at ten percent, allowed businesses to deduct, as a credit against its Federal 
income tax liability, up to ten percent of qualifying investments in tangible personal 
property.  If the MPS/T-5 Equity Owners were allowed the ITC, a portion of the tax 
savings could be passed to the Navy in the form of lower lease payments. 
If the military is to lease from a private entity, tax laws need to be changed 
allowing the same tax incentives for private entities leasing to the Government.  In the 
absence of tax incentives, private companies will either not be able to make enough profit 
to do business with the Government, or private companies will charge a price above the 
military’s strike price.  In either case, both parties lose and, thus, need the tax benefits to 
incentivize investment spending. 
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4. Re-Think Restrictive Leasing Legislation 
 Two of the most devastating pieces of legislation regarding leasing are the 1984 
Department of Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 98-94) and the Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-177).  While the loss of the ACRS for 
depreciation disincentivized private entities from leasing to the Government, the passage 
of both Acts made leasing virtually impossible.  The Balanced Budget and Emergency 
Deficit Control Act of 1985 was passed to give Congress the ability to track progress 
against authorized spending.  It resulted in all DoD components being required to request 
up-front budget authority for the estimated present value of all capital lease payments.  
Thus, Congress would now have to either appropriate the total obligation for the life of 
the lease or it would have to pass special legislation authorizing funding for the lease.   
 The 1984 Department of Defense Authorization Act further restricted Government 
leasing by requiring all long-term leases with substantial termination values to be 
specifically authorized by law.  It further required special notification be given to 
Congress prior to issuing a solicitation for leasing and, in addition, required that a 
detailed description of the lease and justification for leasing be provided.  Finally, the Act 
required a LvP cost comparison be submitted to Congress after OMB and the Treasury 
Department’s review and evaluation. 
 In essence, these two public laws make the red-tape quagmire so thick that it is 
nearly impossible for leasing to be an effective alternative to purchasing—which forces 
DoD agencies to use the procurement method for asset acquisition.  Unfortunately, 
Congress and OMB are not convinced that leasing can be used as a viable financing tool 
for Federal assets.  The enactment of so many rules and regulations makes the leasing 
alternative too difficult.  At a minimum, leasing should be recognized as a workable 
option, allowing exploration of future leasing opportunities.  The first step in this process, 
however, is to re-think “Anti-Leasing” legislation. 
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C. OTHER LVP CONSIDERATIONS: AN AGL, JCT AND HKM 
COMPARISON 
1.  Tax Impact to the Treasury 
As previously discussed in Chapter III and summarized in Table 6, there are three 
main controversies in the LvP decision: tax benefits, discount rate and residual value.  
AGL (pro-lease) and JCT (pro-purchase) disagreed on how best to deal with all three, but 
the chief argument (and, consequently, the one having the greatest financial impact) lies 
in how to reconcile the tax benefits.  Specifically, how do taxes impact the US Treasury 
on a NTCG basis?  Table 11 provides a detailed summary that focuses strictly on the 
NTCG issue.  Included in Table 11 is our analysis (the HKM column), which agrees and 
disagrees with areas in both AGL’s and JCT’s arguments.  (Numbers in parentheses are 
net cash outflows from the Treasury). 
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Table 11. LvP Summary of Tax Effects on a Net Total Cost to the Government 
Basis (Post-TEFRA and No ITC)133 
 
 (millions $) 
ITEM PURCHASE CHARTER 
  AGL JCT HKM 
Ship cost (182.4) - - - 
Tax revenue on Government debt used to 
   finance the purchase134 
2.5 - - - 
Total cost of purchase (179.9) - - - 
     
Present value of Capital Hire payments paid 
   by the Navy 
- (135.1) (135.1) (135.1)
Tax Revenue on Capital Hire payments 
(revenue to Lessor equals taxes at 46%) 
    
          Interest component135 - 39.7 - - 
          Return of capital component  22.0 22.0 22.0 
                                                 
133 Data collected from AGL, JCT and authors’ own analyses.  See Notes 69 and 87 for source 
documents.  All values discounted at 10.25% (5% compounded semi-annually). 
134 Assumes purchase made using 21% Treasury debt financing for a borrower in the 13.5% tax 
bracket (as opposed to a 46% lease debt rate).  [0.21 * (0.135 / 0.46)] = 0.21 * .293 = 0.062 or 6.2%.  
Assuming interest payments paid by the Navy are $39.7 million (see page 20 of Note 69 and page 4 of 
Note 87): 0.062 * $39.7 million = $2.5 million. 
135 JCT’s argument implies that without the Deal the investor will place his money elsewhere in a 
taxable investment, thus, the tax revenue is not incremental.  See pages 18 and 19 of Note 69. 
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Residual value payments at termination 
(assumes 20% residual value, net of tax) 
- (1.7) (1.7) (1.7) 
Lost tax revenue from amortization 
   deduction 
- (0.7) (0.7) (0.7) 
Lost tax revenue from depreciation 
   deduction136 
- (72.4) (72.4) - 
Total present value cost (179.9) (148.2) (187.9) (115.5)
Ship purchase price137 179.9 179.9 179.9 179.9 
Benefit (Cost) to Lease versus Purchase 0 31.7 (8.0) 64.4 
 
As illustrated in Table 11, the total cost difference between HKM and AGL is $32.7 
million.  However, the largest difference, $72.4 million, occurs between HKM and JCT.  
2. AGL, JCT and HKM NTCG Methodology Reconciliation 
Differences between the AGL, JCT and HKM analyses are explained below: 
• Ship Purchase Cost 
o AGL: Vessel cost is $182.4 million. Value calculated using actual 
cost data as stipulated in the firm contract offers and represents the average cost of the 13 
MPS vessels. 
                                                 
136 Schedule 5 of AGL’s Analysis of the Report by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation 
Regarding Tax Aspects of the TAKX Maritime Prepositioning Ship Program and Other Concerns lists 
the ACRS tax benefit as a $77.7 million Treasury outflow.  This schedule, however, does not take into 
consideration the $5.3 million ITC loss, since the IRS ruling came after AGL’s report was published. 
HKM used Note 42 and Tables 1 and 2 of AGL’s report (see Note 87) to determine the $5.3 million 
NTCG impact of the lost ITC.  ($77.7 million - $5.3 million) = $72.4 million. 
137 AGL’s, JCT’s and HKM’s ship purchase prices differ by no more than plus or minus $5 million.  
Actual calculated purchase prices were $182.4 million (AGL), $178.2 million (JCT), and $179.9 
million (HKM).  HKM used $179.9 million as a baseline for comparison purposes.  Further 
explanation provided in Section V.C.2.  See also page A-11 of Note 87 and Note 133. 
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o JCT: Vessel cost is $178.2 million. JCT did not include the 
additional $4.2 million in legal and other fees that were paid by the Lessor for arranging 
the lease. 
o HKM: Vessel cost is $182.4 million.  HKM concurs with AGL’s 
$182.4 million baseline purchase cost, which includes the $4.2 million in legal and other 
fees.  HKM assumes the vessels were purchased using 21 percent Treasury debt financing 
from a borrower in a 13.5 percent tax bracket (as opposed to a 46 percent lease debt rate).  
The subsequent tax rate is given by: 
 
[0.21 * (0.135 / 0.46)] = 0.21 * .293 = 0.062 or 6.2% 
 
Assuming interest payments paid by the Navy are $39.7 million as Schedule 5 of AGL’s 
analysis indicates,138 the resultant tax revenue generated by 21 percent Treasury debt 
financing is: 
 
0.062 * $39.7 million = $2.5 million 
 
• Interest Component of the Tax Revenue on Capital Hire Payments 
o AGL: Value is a $39.7 million Treasury inflow.  Assumes taxes on 
interest income paid by the Lender to the Treasury from the debt portion of the lease.139 
o  JCT: No value.  JCT concluded that it was unnecessary to count 
income taxes paid by the Lender to the Treasury since counting the cash inflows from the 
                                                 
138 Analysis of the Report by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation Regarding Tax Aspects of 
the TAKX Maritime Prepositioning Ship Program and Other Concerns. Argent Group, Ltd. 25 March 
1983. Expressed at a hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Committee on Ways and 
Means on February 28, 1983, A-11. 
139 Ibid, 5. 
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debt portion of the lease would require that similar Treasury inflows from debt used to 
finance the lease also be counted.140 
o HKM: No value.  Without the Deal, the investor will go elsewhere 
to investments where interest income is taxable, so tax revenue is not incremental, and, 
thus, not counted. 
 
• Lost Tax Revenue from Depreciation Deduction 
o AGL: Value is $72.4 million ($77.7 million less $5.3 million ITC 
loss).  This value represents the Treasury’s lost revenue as a result of the Lessor’s use of 
the Deal’s ACRS tax benefit. 
o JCT: Same argument as AGL. 
o HKM: No value. A finite pool of leveraged lease investments 
exists, which limits not only the amount of money that can be invested in this type of 
transaction, but also the number of people sophisticated enough to take advantage of the 
Deal.  Regardless of whether the Deal existed or not, leveraged lease investors will seek 
tax shelters for their money.  Therefore, the Treasury’s lost tax revenue occurs either way 
and, thus, is not considered.  The end result is an “add-back” of AGL’s and JCT’s $72.4 
million tax revenue loss, which makes leasing $72.4 million more attractive. 
 
• Benefit (Cost) to Lease Versus Purchase 
o AGL: The NPV to lease is $148.2 million, making leasing $31.7 
million more cost effective than the $179.9 million purchase price. 
o JCT: The NPV to lease is $187.9 million, making leasing $8 
million less cost effective than purchasing. 
                                                 
140 Ibid. 
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o HKM: The NPV to lease is $115.5 million, making leasing $64.4 
million more cost effective than purchasing.  The availability of such a large cost savings 
is significant even in today’s historically low interest rates (recall that the lower the 
interest rates, the less cost savings realized by a lease over a purchase).  Leasing can still 
be more cost effective if given sufficient legislative and political support. 
3. HKM View on Leveraged Lease Investments 
Long-term capital lease structures are extremely complex, with only a few 
“players” who truly understand how deals such as the MPS/T-5 Program work, and who 
have large sums of investment capital available for these transactions.  Given the 
exclusivity of this “Tax-Sheltered Lease Pool,” only a few investors are available and 
sophisticated enough to understand the deal’s risks and returns.  When this Pool reaches 
its limit, there are no other lease deals in which to invest.  Thus, supply and demand are 
limited to the current level of available lease deals. 
 In 1982, the Pool was “full” when the $2.65 billion MPS/T-5 tanker deal became 
available.  As a result, it displaced the Pool’s least attractive leasing arrangement.  This 
displacement occurred because the Deal was backed by the superior credit of the US 
Government, which gave investors a guaranteed 11.745 percent after-tax return on a “hell 
or high water” basis.141 
 The money for the displaced lease deal would not likely go to a taxable 
investment, as suggested by JCT, since the investor’s intent was to tax shelter his money 
through products that provide significant tax benefits (as the MPS/T-5 Deal did).  Based 
on this intent, the displaced investor would most likely seek other tax-sheltered 
investments such as municipal bonds.  Accordingly, the Treasury would not realize 
revenue on income earned from the investor’s subsequent tax-free investment, and, in 
addition, would not lose tax revenue from the finite Pool of lease deals since the tax loss 
created by these investments would already be deducted and, thus, would not be 
incremental in the LvP decision. 
                                                 
141 See page 26 under “Time Charter” for an understanding of “hell or high water” returns. 
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D. PROJECT SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, the 1982 decision by the United States Navy to lease thirteen T-
AKX class Maritime Prepositioning Ships and five Champion Class T-5 replacement 
tankers has been thoroughly examined.  The laws and regulations that were in place at the 
time of the lease and the cost comparison between the LvP decision have been evaluated.  
In addition, this research project investigated the role played by Argent Group Ltd., the 
financial advisor hired by the Navy for the purpose of overseeing and providing financial 
guidance throughout the MPS/T-5 Program. 
With regard to whether leasing is more cost effective than purchasing, the answer 
largely rests on the degree of legislative and political support and the set of assumptions 
used for the discount rate, the residual value, and the tax benefits received.  In the early 
1980s, an argument could be made that the different parties involved in preparing cost 
comparisons chose assumptions that favored their desired outcome.  However, due to 
subsequent Congressional legislation that changed these assumptions and removed their 
flexibility, the MPS/T-5 Program would be evaluated as more expensive to lease than 
purchase in today’s environment. 
 Clearly, the Navy chose the leasing option in the early 1980s because it needed to 
capitalize the war-fighting fleet rather than fund non-combatant support vessels.  When 
the Military Sealift Command realized a funding shortage might jeopardize the MPS/T-5 
vessels the natural decision was to find an alternate method for funding these 
requirements.  Leasing provided that alternative.  However, Congress’s leasing 
inexperience coupled with a lack of governing legislation eventually allowed the leases to 
occur. 
While capital leasing could have a future, the current legislative and political 
environment would have to drastically change to embrace it.  Many laws would need to 
be re-thought so equity owners receive tax benefits to incentivize their capital investment.  
The trade off would be the Government’s ability to spread its payments over the useful 
life of the leased asset.  Furthermore, capital leasing would allow the military to bypass a 
lengthy procurement process, which could result in it receiving assets sooner.  Capital 
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leasing also allows the Government to obtain assets that would otherwise have never 
been procured due to budget constraints. 
E. DIRECTION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
An area this project has not addressed is the trade-off between using a more cost 
effective but lengthier buying process versus a shorter but more expensive leasing one.  
While the two processes can be compared quantitatively using their monetary values, it is 
extremely difficult to compare the qualitative advantages of bypassing the procurement 
process and receiving an asset sooner than the procurement process could have delivered 
it.  Thus, a set of qualitative metrics needs to be developed to determine when long-term 
leasing should be used rather than procurement.  This measure could then be combined 
with the quantitative monetary measures to determine the correct course for obtaining 
military assets.  
 The area of Net Total Cost of Government Ownership should also be considered 
for future research.  Research would determine if there is a difference between capital 
leasing and procurement in the total cost of Government ownership and determine any 
realizable savings.  The findings could be used as another factor in evaluating the LvP 
decision. 
 Another area for future research centers on the use of COTS products verses items 
unique only to the military.  COTS items are generally less expensive, more readily 
available, and can be delivered sooner.  Thus, research to determine if COTS items 

































CAPABILITIES OF THE LEASED SHIPS 
 
 
T-5 Tankers (5):  
General comments on the five T-5 Tankers: 
 
• All were built by American SB Co, Tampa, FL 
• Commissioned dates:   
o MV Gus W. Darnell (T-AOT 1121): 11 SEP 1985  
o USNS Paul Buck (T-AOT 1122): 07 JUN 1985 
o USNS Samuel L. Cobb (T-AOT 1123): 15 NOV 1985 
o USNS Richard G. Matthiesen (T-AOT 1124): 18 FEB 1986 
o USNS Lawrence H. Gianella (T-AOT 1125): 22 APR 1986 
• Displacement, tons: 39,624 full load. 
• Dimensions, feet (meters): 615 x 90 x 36 (187.5 x 27.4 x  10.8). 
• Main machinery: 1 Sulzer 5RTA76 diesel; 18,400 hp (m) (13.52 MW) sustained; 1 shaft. 
• Compliment (generally): 23 (9 officers). 
• Cargo capacity: 238,400 barrels of oil. 
• Comment: Built for Ocean Carriers Inc, Houston, Texas specifically for long-term charter to 
the Military Sealift Command (20 years) as Ocean Transportation ships. The last two 
(Matthiesen & Gianella) are able to rig underway replenish gear. 
• Sources:  
 
Military Sealift Command. MSC Ship Inventory. Sealift. 
www.msc.navy.mil (accessed 16 July 2004) 
 
Saunders, Stephen, ed. Jane’s Fighting Ships 2001-2002. Surrey: Jane’s Information Group 




Maritime Preposition Ships (13):  
General comments on the five Maritime Preposition Ships: 
 
The Maersk Line operates the following five ships for the MPS: 
• MV CPL Louis J. Hague Jr. (T-AK 3000) – MPSRON 3 / commissioned: 07 SEP 1984 
• MV PFC William B. Baugh (T-AK 3001) – MPSRON 1 / commissioned: 30 OCT 1984 
• MV PFC James Anderson Jr. (T-AK 3002) – MPSRON 3 / commissioned: 26 MAR 1985 
• MV 1ST LT Alex Bonnyman (T-AK 3003) – MPSRON 3 / commissioned: 26 SEP 1985 
• MV PVT Franklin J. Phillips (T-AK 3004) – MPSRON 2 / commissioned: 12 SEP 1985 
Comments: 
• Odense Staalskibsvaerft, Lindo, Denmark, built all. (Bethlehem Steel at Sparrows Point, 
Maryland converted Hague, Anderson and Phillips. Baugh and Bonnyman were converted at 
Beaumont, Texas). 
• Main machinery: One Sulzer 7RND 76M, 7-cylider diesel; 16,800 bhp bow thruster; one 
shaft. 
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• Compliment (generally): 20 contract mariners, 7 MSC crew + 30 maintenance crew + 80 
troops. 
• Cargo capacity: 23,000 tons maximum. 
• Each ship carries one fifth of the vehicles, equipment, and supplies to outfit a Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). Transport up to 413 containers (280 ammunition, 86 general 
cargo, 23 drummed fuel, 24 refrigerated), plus providing 11,369m2 vehicle cargo space. There 
are four 30-ton and two 36-ton pedestal cranes, side-loading vehicle ports amidships (with 
portable 13.7 – or 27.4m ramps), and a 66-long-ton-capacity, 32m long, 4.9m wide Navire 
slewing ramp aft beneath a helicopter deck. There are eight cargo hatches and three vehicle-
parking decks. Liquid cargo includes 4,920m3 of transferable vehicle fuel, 504m3 of potable 
water, and 2,252m3 of lube oil. 
• Phillips serves as the Flagship of MPSRON 2, carrying an eight-man navy communications 
team and equipment for the 7th MEB, Twenty-Nine Palms, California. 
• Sources: 
 
Military Sealift Command. MSC Ship Inventory. Prepositioning Ships. 
www.msc.navy.mil (accessed 16 July 2004) 
 
Baker III, A. D. The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World 2002-2003. 
Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 2002. 1000. 
 
 
The Waterman Line operates the following three ships for the MPS: 
• SS SGT Matej Kocak (T-AK 3005) – MPSRON 2 / commissioned: 05 OCT 1984 
• SS PFC Eugene A. Obregon (T-AK 3006) – MPSRON 1 / commissioned: 15 JAN 1985 
• SS MAJ Stephen W. Pless (T-AK 3007) – MPSRON 3 / commissioned: 01 MAY 1985 
Comments: 
• All were built by Sun SB, Chester, PA (converted by National Steel and SB, San Diego, CA). 
• Main machinery: Two sets General Electric-geared steam turbines; one 6-bladed propeller; 
32,000 shp thruster; one shaft. 
• Compliment (generally): 85 contract mariners, 7 MSC crew, 8 navy + 25 maintenance crew. 
• Cargo capacity: 25,000 tons maximum. 
• Each ship is intended to transport one fourth of the vehicles, fuel, supplies, and provisions to 
support the MEB. In the forward three holds, they can carry 213 ammunition, 150 “Lo/Lo,” 
10 general cargo, 32 drummed-fuel, and 32 refrigerated containers. The remainder of the 
cargo consists of a large number of vehicles and cargo, fuel, and water. These ships were 
lengthened 39.8m during conversion, and a helicopter deck and ramp was added. They have 
paired 50-ton and paired 35-ton portal cranes and retain a 30-ton capacity traveling gantry 
forward to handle containerized cargo. The articulating stern ramp can support up to 200 tons 
and is 40.8m long. There is a 65-ton capacity, 13.6 x 4.4m internal vehicle elevator. 
• Sources: 
 
Military Sealift Command. MSC Ship Inventory. Prepositioning Ships. 
www.msc.navy.mil (accessed 16 July 2004) 
 
Baker III, A. D. The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World 2002-2003. 
Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 2002. 1000. 
 
 
The American Overseas Corporation (a subsidiary of General Dynamics) operates the following five ships 
for MPS: 
• MV 2ND LT John P. Bobo (T-AK 3008) – MPSRON 1 / commissioned: 14 APR 1985 
• MV PFC Dewayne T. Williams (T-AK 3009) – MPSRON 1 / commissioned: 06 JUN 1985 
• MV 1ST LT Baldomero Lopez (T-AK 3010) – MPSRON 2 / commissioned: 21 NOV 1985 
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• MV 1ST LT Jack Lummus (T-AK 3011) – MPSRON 3 / commissioned: 06 MAR 1986 
• MV SGT William R. Button (T-AK 3012) – MPSRON 2 / commissioned: 22 MAY 1986 
Comments: 
• All were built by General Dynamics, Quincy, Massachusetts 
• Main machinery: Two Stork Werkspoor 18TM410V diesels; one propeller; 26,400 bhp 
thruster; 1,000-shp bow-thruster 
• Compliment (generally): 30 contract mariners, 7 MSC crew, 7 navy + 25 vehicle maintenance 
personnel 
• Cargo capacity: 25,384 tons maximum 
• Each ship can carry up to 522 standard 20ft. vans (350 for ammunition, 110 for general stores, 
30 for fuel drums, and 32 refrigerated), plus 14,000m2 of roll-on/roll-off vehicle capacity to 
carry up to 1,400 vehicles. A 66-long-ton capacity, 32m-long, 4.9m-wide Navire stern 
slewing ramp provides access to the six vehicle decks and can discharge either vehicles to a 
pier or amphibious vehicles of up to 23 tons directly into the water, the stern door measures 
11 x 4.55m. The upper deck can stow two LCM (8) landing craft, six unpowered causeway 
sections, four powered causeway sections, a warping tug, four pipe trailers, and 16 hose reels.  
Carry 5,764.6m3 (1,523,000 Gallons) of transferable bulk fuel, plus 2,039 55-gallon fuel 
drums. Each ship can also transport 307m3 of potable water. Five 39-ton pedestal cranes are 
fitted, with two sets being paired, and there is a large helicopter deck at the stern. Unloading 
rates: all vehicles and cargo at a pier in 12 hours; all cargo at a pier in 3 days; all cargo while 
moored out in 5 days. There is a four-point mooring system. In addition to those for the listed 
personnel, there are 102 temporary berths for vehicle crews. 
• Sources: 
 
Military Sealift Command. MSC Ship Inventory. Prepositioning Ships. 
www.msc.navy.mil (accessed 16 July 2004) 
 
Baker III, A. D. The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World 2002-2003. 
Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 2002. 1000. 
 
 
Maritime Preposition Ship Squadrons (3):  
General comments on Maritime Preposition Ship Squadrons: 
 
There are three MPS Squadrons (MPSRON) logistically located at forward deployed areas around the 
world: 
  
• MPSRON 1 operates out of the Mediterranean Sea / eastern Atlantic Ocean. It carries 
equipment for the 6th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.  
• MPSRON 2 operates out of Diego Garcia (British Indian Ocean Territory). It carries 
equipment for the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Twenty-Nine Palms, California. 
• MPSRON 3 operates out of Guam / Saipan in the western Pacific Ocean. It carries equipment 
for the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, Hawaii. 
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SHIPS ACQUIRED IN THE LEASE AGREEMENT: 
 
MV Gus W. Darnell (T-AOT 1121) – Long-term Chartered Tanker 
 Length: 615 ft 
 Beam: 90 ft 
 Draft: 36 ft 
 Displacement: 39,624 long tons 
 Speed: 16 kts 
 Civilian: 24 
Source: 
Military Sealift Command. MSC Ship Inventory. Sealift Ships. Gus W. Darnell, MV. 
http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/ships.asp?ship=guswdarnell&type=LongtermCharteredTanker 
(accessed 16 July 2004). 
 
MV Gus W. Darnell 
 
 
USNS Paul Buck (T-AOT 1122) – Government-owned Tanker 
 Length: 615 ft 
 Beam: 90 ft 
 Draft: 36 ft 
 Displacement: 39,624 long tons 
 Speed: 16 kts 
 Civilian: 24 
Source: 
Military Sealift Command. MSC Ship Inventory. Sealift Ships. Paul Buck, USNS. 
 http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/ships.asp?ship= paulbuck&type=GovernmentownedTanker 




USNS Paul Buck 
 
USNS Samuel L. Cobb (T-AOT 1123) – Government-owned Tanker 
 Length: 615 ft 
 Beam: 90 ft 
 Draft: 36 ft 
 Displacement: 41,500 long tons 
 Speed: 16 kts 
 Civilian: 24 
Source: 
Military Sealift Command. MSC Ship Inventory. Sealift Ships. Samuel L. Cobb, USNS. 
 http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/ships.asp?ship= samuellcobb&type=GovernmentownedTanker 
(accessed 16 July 2004). 
 
USNS Samuel L. Cobb 
 
 
USNS Richard G. Matthiesen (T-AOT 1124) – Government-owned Tanker 
 Length: 615 ft 
 Beam: 90 ft 
 Draft: 36 ft 
 Displacement: 39,624 long tons 
 Speed: 16 kts 
 Civilian: 24 
 98
Source: 
Military Sealift Command. MSC Ship Inventory. Sealift Ships. Richard G. Matthiesen, USNS. 
http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/ships.asp?ship=richardgmatthiesen&type=GovernmentownedTanker 
(accessed 16 July 2004). 
 
USNS Richard G. Matthiesen 
 
USNS Lawrence H. Gianella  (T-AOT 1125) – Government-owned Tanker 
 Length: 615 ft 
 Beam: 90 ft 
 Draft: 36 ft 
 Displacement: 39,624 long tons 
 Speed: 16 kts 
 Civilian: 24 
Source:  
Military Sealift Command. MSC Ship Inventory. Sealift Ships. Lawrence H. Gianella, USNS. 
http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/ships.asp?ship=lawrencehgianella&type=GovernmentownedTanker 
(accessed 16 July 2004). 
 
 




MV CPL Louis J. Hague Jr. (T-AK 3000) – Container & Roll-on/Roll-off Ship 
 Length: 755 ft 5 in 
 Beam: 90 ft 
 Draft: 32 ft 10 in 
 Displacement: 44,088 long tons 
 Speed: 16.4 kts 
 Squadron: MPSRON 3 
 Civilian: 25 
 Military: 11 
Source:  
Military Sealift Command. MSC Ship Inventory. Prepositioning Ships, MV CPL Louis J. Hague Jr. 
http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/ships.asp?ship=cpllouisjhaugejr&type=ContainerRollonRolloffShip 
(accessed 16 July 2004). 
 
MV CPL Louis J. Hague Jr. 
 
 
MV PFC William B. Baugh (T-AK 3001) – Container & Roll-on/Roll-off Ship 
 Length: 755 ft 5 in 
 Beam: 90 ft 
 Draft: 32 ft 10 in 
 Displacement: 44,088 long tons 
 Speed: 16.4 kts 
 Squadron: MPSRON 1 
 Civilian: 25 
Source:  
Military Sealift Command. MSC Ship Inventory. Prepositioning Ships, MV PFC William B. Baugh. 
http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/ships.asp?ship=pfcwilliambbaugh&type=ContainerRollonRolloffShip 








MV PFC James Anderson Jr. (T-AK 3002) – Container & Roll-on/Roll-off Ship 
 Length: 755 ft 5 in 
 Beam: 90 ft 
 Draft: 32 ft 10 in 
 Displacement: 44,088 long tons 
 Speed: 16.4 kts 
 Squadron: MPSRON 3 
 Civilian: 25 
Source:  
Military Sealift Command. MSC Ship Inventory. Prepositioning Ships, MV PFC James Anderson Jr. 
http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/ships.asp?ship=pfcjamesandersonjr&type=ContainerRollonRolloffShip 
(accessed 16 July 2004). 
 
MV PFC James Anderson Jr. 
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MV 1ST LT Alex Bonnyman (T-AK 3003) – Container & Roll-on/Roll-off Ship 
 Length: 755 ft 5 in 
 Beam: 90 ft 1 in 
 Draft: 32 ft 10 in 
 Displacement: 44,088 long tons 
 Speed: 16.4 kts 
 Squadron: MPSRON 3 
 Civilian: 25 
 Military: 3 
Source:  
Military Sealift Command. MSC Ship Inventory. Prepositioning Ships, MV 1ST LT Alex Bonnyman 
http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/ships.asp?ship=1stltalexbonnyman&type=ContainerRollonRolloffShip 
(accessed 16 July 2004). 
 
MV 1ST LT Alex Bonnyman 
 
 
MV PVT Franklin J. Phillips (T-AK 3004) – Container & Roll-on/Roll-off Ship 
 Length: 755 ft 5 in 
 Beam: 90 ft  
 Draft: 32 ft 10 in 
 Displacement: 44,088 long tons 
 Speed: 16.4 kts 
 Squadron: MPSRON 2 
 Civilian: 25 
Source:  
Military Sealift Command. MSC Ship Inventory. Prepositioning Ships, MV PVT Franklin J. Phillips. 
http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/ships.asp?ship=pvtfranklinjphillips&type=ContainerRollonRolloffShip 




MV PVT Franklin J. Phillips 
 
 
SS SGT Matej Kocak (T-AK 3005) – Container & Roll-on/Roll-off Ship 
 Length: 821 ft  
 Beam: 105 ft 8 in  
 Draft: 34 ft 
 Displacement: 51,612 long tons 
 Speed: 20 kts 
 Squadron: MPSRON 2 
 Civilian: 26 
Source:  
Military Sealift Command. MSC Ship Inventory. Prepositioning Ships, SS SGT Matej Kocak. 
http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/ships.asp?ship=sgtmatejkocak&type=ContainerRollonRolloffShip 
(accessed 16 July 2004). 
 




SS PFC Eugene A. Obregon (T-AK 3006) – Container & Roll-on/Roll-off Ship 
 Length: 821 ft  
 Beam: 105 ft 8 in  
 Draft: 34 ft 
 Displacement: 51,612 long tons 
 Speed: 20 kts 
 Squadron: MPSRON 1 
 Civilian: 26 
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Source:  
Military Sealift Command. MSC Ship Inventory. Prepositioning Ships, SS PFC Eugene A. Obregon. 
http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/ships.asp?ship=pfceugeneaobregon&type=ContainerRollonRolloffShip 
(accessed 16 July 2004). 
 
SS PFC Eugene A. Obregon 
 
 
SS MAJ Stephen W. Pless (T-AK 3007) – Container & Roll-on/Roll-off Ship 
 Length: 821 ft  
 Beam: 105 ft 8 in  
 Draft: 34 ft 
 Displacement: 51,612 long tons 
 Speed: 20 kts 
 Squadron: MPSRON 3 
 Civilian: 26 
Source:  
Military Sealift Command. MSC Ship Inventory. Prepositioning Ships, SS MAJ Stephen W. Pless. 
http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/ships.asp?ship=majstephenwpless&type=ContainerRollonRolloffShip 
(accessed 16 July 2004). 
 




MV 2ND LT John P. Bobo (T-AK 3008) – Container & Roll-on/Roll-off Ship 
 Length: 673 ft 2 in  
 Beam: 105 ft 6 in  
 Draft: 33 ft 
 Displacement: 46,111 long tons 
 Speed: 17.7 kts 
 Squadron: MPSRON 1 
 Civilian: 29 
 Military: 8 
Source:  
Military Sealift Command. MSC Ship Inventory. Prepositioning Ships, MV 2ND LT John P. Bobo. 
http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/ships.asp?ship=2ndltjohnpbobo&type=ContainerRollonRolloffShip 
(accessed 16 July 2004). 
 




MV PFC Dewayne T. Williams (T-AK 3009) – Container & Roll-on/Roll-off Ship 
 Length: 673 ft 2 in  
 Beam: 105 ft 6 in  
 Draft: 33 ft 
 Displacement: 46,111 long tons 
 Speed: 17.7 kts 
 Squadron: MPSRON 1 
 Civilian: 29 
Source:  
Military Sealift Command. MSC Ship Inventory. Prepositioning Ships, MV PFC Dewayne T. Williams. 
http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/ships.asp?ship=pfcdewaynetwilliams&type=ContainerRollonRolloffSh
ip (accessed 16 July 2004). 
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MV 1ST LT Baldomero Lopez (T-AK 3010) – Container & Roll-on/Roll-off Ship 
 Length: 673 ft 2 in  
 Beam: 105 ft 6 in  
 Draft: 33 ft 
 Displacement: 46,111 long tons 
 Speed: 17.7 kts 
 Squadron: MPSRON 2 
 Civilian: 29 
Source:  
Military Sealift Command. MSC Ship Inventory. Prepositioning Ships, MV 1ST LT Baldomero Lopez. 
http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/ships.asp?ship=1stltbaldomerolopez&type=ContainerRollonRolloffShi
p (accessed 16 July 2004). 
 
MV 1ST LT Baldomero Lopez 
 
 
MV 1ST LT Jack Lummus (T-AK 3011) – Container & Roll-on/Roll-off Ship 
 Length: 673 ft 2 in  
 Beam: 105 ft 6 in  
 Draft: 33 ft 
 Displacement: 46,111 long tons 
 Speed: 17.7 kts 
 Squadron: MPSRON 3 
 Civilian: 29 
 Military: 8 
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Source:  
Military Sealift Command. MSC Ship Inventory. Prepositioning Ships, MV 1ST LY Jack Lummus. 
http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/ships.asp?ship=1stltjacklummus&type=ContainerRollonRolloffShip 
(accessed 16 July 2004). 
 




MV SGT William R. Button (T-AK 3012) – Container & Roll-on/Roll-off Ship 
 Length: 673 ft 2 in  
 Beam: 105 ft 6 in  
 Draft: 33 ft 
 Displacement: 46,111 long tons 
 Speed: 17.7 kts 
 Squadron: MPSRON 2 
 Civilian: 29 
Source: 
Military Sealift Command. MSC Ship Inventory. Prepositioning Ships, MV SGT William R. Button. 
 http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/ships.asp?ship=sgtwilliamrbutton&type=ContainerRollonRolloffShip 
(accessed 16 July 2004). 
 
MV SGT William R. Button 
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APPENDIX B 
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE MPS/T-5 LEASE VERSUS 
PURCHASE HISTORY 
 
Note: The reference for all quotes found in this chronology can be sourced to footnotes in their 




1870 – The first Anti-Deficiency Act (R.S. 3679) passed.  It prohibited the commingling 
of current appropriations and the diversion of old appropriations to purposes for which 




1905 – An amendment to the Anti-Deficiency Act passed.  This amendment revised the 
law to state that all "obligations," rather than all contracts, were prohibited unless 
adequate appropriations were available.  The Act was further amended in 1906 and 1950.  
 
1917 – The Jones Act passed.  The Act required that all cargo, including oil products 
moved between US ports, be 1) carried in ships manufactured in the US, 2) owned 75 
percent by US parties, and 3) crewed by American citizens. 
 
1962 – The Internal Revenue Service provided American businesses with an investment 





June 20, 1972 – The Navy entered into a lease agreement for the charter of nine T-2 
replacement tankers to replace 14 WWII-vintage T-2 tankers. 
 
August 1979 – MPS (TAKX) Program authorized by Secretary of Defense Harold 
Brown.   
 
1980-1989 
September 8, 1980 – TAKX ships authorized by Congress. 
 
1981 – The Economic Recovery Act of 1981 passed.  This Act initiated the Accelerated 
Cost Recovery System (ACRS), which allowed companies to accelerate their 
depreciation over a shorter than normal period of time.   
 
October 14, 1981 – Naval Sea Systems Command issued Request For Proposal No. 
N00024-82-R-2051 TAKX Maritime Prepositioning Ships, which requested proposals to 
either purchase or charter 12 to 15 TAKX Maritime Prepositioning Ships. 
 
November 1981 – Navy and DoD personnel conducted an informal meeting with IRS 
personnel regarding the impending lease of the TAKX and T-5 ships.  No binding 
decisions were made. 
 
December 8, 1981 – Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the convert and charter 
program for inclusion in the fiscal year 1983 budget with the concurrence of OMB. 
 
December 1981 – Office of Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy approved 
the use of charter rather than purchase.   
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1982 – Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act passed.  The Act restricted the buying 
and selling of corporate tax breaks. 
 
January 11, 1982 – MSC issued RFP No. N00033-82-R-7002 for the charter of five T-5 
replacement tankers to replace five WWII-vintage T-5 tankers. 
 
January 1982 – Technical offers received from ten offerors under the TAKX RFP. 
 
February 11, 1982 – Coopers and Lybrand, a “Big 8” accounting firm hired by the Navy 
to analyze the lease versus purchase decision, completed its study. 
 
February 22, 1982 – MSC issued RFP No. N00033-82-R-0532, which requested a 
proposal for 2,000 hours of financial advisory services to effectively evaluate the 
financial aspects of all proposals being submitted on both the MPS and T-5 RFPs. 
 
March 1982 – Price proposals received by NAVSEA on TAKX RFP. 
 
March 28, 1982 – Secretary of the Navy John Lehman sent a letter to the House 
Appropriations Committee, which stated that the Navy intended to maintain its policies in 
support of the American Merchant Marine and the American Shipbuilding Industry. 
 
April 5 1982 – Argent Group Ltd. awarded the contract to act as Financial Advisor to 
MSC. 
 
May 1982 – Initial offers received from nine offerors under T-5 tanker RFP. 
 




July 20 1982 – Defense Subcommittee Chairman of the House Appropriations 
Committee J. Addabbo stated in a letter to the SECNAV that the Navy’s original plans 
called for procurement of new and converted ships; the fiscal year 1982 Budget 
Amendment changed it to a charter arrangement.  He also directed the Navy not to enter 
into any contractual agreements with respect to the Deal until Congress reviewed the 
Investigative Staff’s LvP analysis of present value costs to the Government. 
 
July 30 1982 – SECNAV agreed to “withhold any firm contractual arrangements” until 
Congress could review the Deal. 
 
August 17, 1982 – Conditional TAKX awards made to Maersk (3 ships firm + 2 option 
for FY-83), Waterman (1 ship firm + 2 option for FY-83), General Dynamics (2 ships 
firm + 3 option for FY-83).  Congress advised. 
 
August 18, 1982 – Public notified of contract award and amount. 
 
August 19, 1982 – AGL submitted supplemental report on the TAKX MPS Program.  
Using actual cost data as stipulated in the firm contract offer, AGL concluded that the 
Navy’s present value cost to charter the TAKX vessels were $140.56 million per vessel, 
compared to a purchase cost of $184.01 million. 
 
September 1, 1982 – Surveys and Investigations Report submitted to the House 
Appropriations Committee.  The report concluded that “using present value (PV) analysis 
and the OMB directed 10 percent PV discount rate, leasing the TAKX vessels was 
advantageous to the Navy and the Government at all long-term interest rates less than 18-
19 percent.” 
 
September 14, 1982 – Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Tower wrote 
to SECNAV and stated that the Navy was in compliance with Section 303 of the FY-83 
Authorization Act and approved the Navy’s pursuit of the TAKX vessels. 
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September 16, 1982 – Defense Subcommittee Chairman of the House Appropriations 
Committee J. Addabbo wrote to SECNAV to inform him that the Defense Subcommittee 
of the House Appropriations Committee agreed, based on the S&I Report, that leasing the 
TAKX vessels was the better option. 
 
September 17, 1982 – House Subcommittee on Readiness held a hearing on the TAKX 
Program.  During this hearing, the following opinions were expressed:  
 
• Assistant SECNAV (Shipbuilding & Logistics) G. Sawyer stated that annual 
capital charter costs would be $14.95 million based on anticipated interest 
costs, which was $20 million less per ship than expected. 
• Subcommittee on Readiness Chairman D. Daniel expressed dissatisfaction 
with the fact that the Navy’s use of long-term leases “effectively circumvents 
the Congressional authorization/appropriations process and impedes timely 
and effective legislative review.  
 
September 1982 – Conditional award made to Ocean Carriers (a.k.a. Shipholdings) (2 
tankers firm + 3 option). 
 
September 30, 1982 – Argent submitted its T-5 Tanker Replacement Supplemental 
Report. Using actual cost data as stipulated in the firm contract offer, AGL concluded 
that the Navy’s present value cost to charter the T-5 Replacement vessels would be 
$49.54 million per vessel, compared to a purchase cost of $66 million.  The analysis 
included the revisions made by the TEFRA. 
 
October 1982 – Option exercised for 2nd Waterman TAKX. 
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December 2, 1982 – The Comptroller of the Navy requested the legal opinion of the 
United States Comptroller General as to the proper manner in which to record certain 
obligations of the Naval Industrial Fund in connection with the TAKX/T-5 Program. 
 
1983 – FY-1983 Department of Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 97-252) passed. 
Section 303 required the Navy to notify the House and Senate Appropriations and Armed 
Services Committees prior to entering long-term leases. 
 
1983 – Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1983 (Public Law. 98-63) passed.  Congress 
granted the Navy authority to proceed with the leasing arrangements in the absence of an 
appropriation covering the total termination liability of the lease agreement. 
 
January 14, 1983 – Options exercised for 4th and 5th Maersk, 3rd - 5th General Dynamics, 
and 3rd Waterman TAKX.  Also the GAO opinion regarding termination liability 
accounting was obtained. 
 
January 28, 1983 – USCGEN’s office issued its report on the NIF in connection with the 
TAKX/T-5 Program.  It stated that upon receipt of the ships, the Navy must record the 
total cost for the five-year base period plus the termination value as if terminated at the 
end of the five-year period. 
 
January 30, 1983 – Washington Post article, “Rent-a-Navy,” critical of TAKX/T-5 Deal, 
declared that the majority of the Deal’s cost is hidden from view because it shows up as a 
tax loss to the Treasury rather than a direct cost in the budget and that “Congress owes it 
to itself and the taxpayer to tell the Pentagon to terminate [the] leases immediately and to 
prohibit the evasion of budget limits.” 
 
February 1983 – Institute for Defense Analyses (Program Analysis Division) prepared a 
lease versus purchase analysis for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Research and 
Engineering.  It concluded that leasing is more cost effective than purchasing. 
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February 15, 1983 – Joint Committee on Taxation issued report on the Tax Aspects of 
Federal Leasing. 
 
February 23, 1983 – Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) wrote to Donald T. 
Regan, Secretary of the Treasury, to describe the tax indemnification provision of the 
Deal as “outrageous” and asked him to “raise in the Cabinet the question of whether it is 
appropriate and acceptable for [the Navy] to subsidize a legal case against the IRS.” 
 
February 25, 1983 – Washington Post article, “Navy Promises Suppliers Tax Breaks,” 
Senator Metzenbaum again voiced displeasure regarding the Deal: “The whole idea of the 
Navy leasing ships instead of buying them has raised some eyebrows on the Hill [Capitol 
Hill], but discovering that we would subsidize these companies if the Internal Revenue 
Service rules against these questionable tax breaks is absolutely unbelievable.” The Navy 
responded that it had “executed a charter program for cargo-carrying services based on 
sound business practices, [that it was] mindful of current tax laws and the best interests of 
the American people, [and that it did so] in full and public view with the express 
permission of Congress.” 
 
February 28, 1983 – Everett Pyatt, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
(Shipbuilding and Logistics), delivered a statement before the Subcommittee on 
Oversight of the House Ways and Means Committee regarding the Navy’s TAKX 
Program.  He stated that the conclusions of the independent LvP studies indicated that 
chartering the TAKX/T-5 vessels could save the Navy 19 percent of the ship’s cost in 
present value dollars.  However, he also revealed that the assumptions (i.e., discount rate, 
pre-tax/after-tax basis, and various participant tax rates) were variable and could have a 
range of results from a 15 percent savings to a five percent additional cost.  He also 
addressed Senator Metzenbaum’s concerns by saying that legal fees associated with 
charter and build contracts were common and assured Congress that “[n]o legal expenses 
incurred in connection with lawsuits, actions, disputes or similar proceedings in which 
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the Government is an adverse party may be included in the Basic Capitalized Costs [; 
however,] [t]he fees may be adjusted to reflect actual costs, but cannot exceed the amount 
proposed by the offeror.” 
 
March 18, 1983 – Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Ways and Means 
Committee Chairman Charles B. Rangel (D-NY) sent a letter to SECNAV with further 
questions regarding the TAKX/T-5 Program.  SECNAV responded to all his questions 
the same day.  
 
March 25, 1983 – AGL issued a rebuttal analysis of the Joint Committee on Taxation’s 
February 15, 1983, report on the Tax Aspects of the TAKX MPS Program. 
 
April 1983 – Options exercised for 3rd - 5th T-5 tanker. 
 
June 8, 1983 – John E. Chapoton, Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy) Department of the 
Treasury, testified before the House Ways and Means Committee.  He discussed H.R. 
3110, the Governmental Leasing Act of 1983, which would deny certain tax incentives 
for property used by Governments and other tax-exempt entities.  He also stated that the 
Treasury Department supported the Bill as it applied to property used by domestic 
entities and foreign Governments. 
 
June 28, 1983 – USCGEN’s (a.k.a. GAO) issued an analytical report on DoD’s use of 
long-term capital leases.  Among other things, it recommended that Congress pass 
legislation to prevent DoD from entering into long-term leases without Congressional 
analysis and authorization.  GAO also alleged, using the JCT’s methodology and 
assumptions, that its and the JCT’s analyses demonstrated true LvP costs (whereas they 
claimed AGL used constant dollars when discounting instead of current dollars--AGL 
subsequently rebutted this claim). 
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September 1983 – The FY 1984 Department of Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 98-94) 
passed.  The Act established a number of statutory conditions and requirements for 
entering into long-term leases.  These requirements, which have since been codified in 10 
U.S.C. 2401, increased Congressional control over certain lease decisions, made lease 
decisions more transparent, and provided for the development of more detailed guidelines 
for conducting lease versus purchase comparisons.   
 
November 1983 – IDA published its revised report on the LvP of Naval auxiliary ships.  
This report maintained its earlier conclusion (Feb 83) that leasing was more cost effective 
than purchasing. 
 
October 31, 1984 – The OMB and Treasury issued joint guidelines for DoD’s leases 
(Joint OMB and Treasury Guidelines to the Department of Defense Covering Lease or 
Charter Arrangements for Aircraft or Naval Vessels), which required that any special tax 
benefits conveyed to the ship-owner be added to the cost of a lease in a lease versus 
purchase analysis. 
 
December 10, 1984 – The Internal Revenue Service ruled that the Deal was a ‘usage’ 
vice a ‘service’ contract, which made the Income Tax Credit unavailable. (Each contract, 
however, contained a clause indemnifying the lessor from the loss of the ITC.  As a 
result, the Navy agreed to return to the lessor the amount of the ITC in the form of 
increased capital hire payments.) 
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1984 – The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-369) passed.  The Act 
modified tax laws and eliminated the benefits available to the owners of assets leased to 
Government entities.  Specifically, it removed the ability for the Equity Owners to use the 
Accelerated Cost Recovery System.  The legislation also reduced the availability of tax 
benefits by lengthening the period for tax depreciation to a period equal to 125 percent of 
the lease term.  It eliminated the ITC for owners of assets leased to Government entities.      
This legislation was not retroactive to prior lease agreements.   
 
1985 – Appropriations Act of 1985 (Public Law 98-473) passed.  Congress provided the 
Navy with additional contract authority, which allowed the Navy to proceed with the 
leasing arrangements in the absence of an appropriation or existing unobligated balance 
sufficient to cover the total lease payments for all five years of the 5-year base period. 
 
1985 – Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-
177) passed.  The Act established statutory limits on federal Government spending by 
creating spending caps on discretionary spending.  To track progress against and 
compliance with budget enforcement requirements and spending caps, budget 





1990 – Oil Pollution Act of 1990 passed.  The Act required that all tankers built after 
1990 to be double-hulled.  In addition, the act slowly phased out all existing single-hulled 
tankers. 
 
August 1990 – MPSRON-1 and MPSRON-2 deployed to Saudi Arabia to off-load 
equipment for Marine Expeditionary Units in support of Operation Desert Shield. 
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December 1990 – MPSRON-3 units deployed to Saudi Arabia to off-load equipment in 
support of ODS. 
 
February 1991 – US-led multi-national forces ground campaign (Operation Desert 
Storm) to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait accomplished in less than 48 hours. 
 
Summer – Fall 1991 – MPF ships provided logistic support for Operation Fiery Vigil, 
the humanitarian assistance to US forces and the Philippine people during the eruption 
and aftermath of Mount Pinatubo.   
 
October 29, 1992 – OMB Circular A-94 (Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-
Cost Analysis of Federal Programs) issued to prevent lease versus purchase analysis 
from understating the Government’s total cost of leasing.  This guidance, applied 
Government-wide, prescribed that analysis (1) should add special tax benefits to the cost 
of leasing, and (2) should not subtract the normal payment of taxes on the lessor’s income 
derived from the leases from the total lease costs. 
 
Winter – Spring 1993 – MPF ships provided logistic support for Operation Restore 
Hope, which enabled USMC forces to deploy to Somalia. 
 
1997 – The Balance Budget Act of 1997 (Public Law 99-177) passed.  The Act amended 
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-177) by 
extending the discretionary spending caps to the year 2002. 
 
May 2001 – MSC investigated possible replacement alternatives for the T-5 Tanker 
whose 20 year leases were expiring.  The resultant study was titled T-5 Tankers: 
Replacement Alternatives. 
 
September 11, 2001 – US homeland attacked by Islamic Extremists of the Al Qaeda 
terrorist network.  Approximately 3,000 US citizens killed. 
 118
 
October 25, 2001 – Operation Enduring Freedom, the assault against the Taliban 
Government and Terrorist Forces in Afghanistan, began. 
 
January 15, 2003 – MSC exercised options to buy Shipholding #1 T-5 tanker, Paul 
Buck; Shipholding #3 T-5 tanker, Samuel L. Cobb; Shipholding #4 T-5 tanker, Richard 
G. Matthiesen; and Shipholding #5 T-5 tanker, Lawrence H. Gianella. 
 
January 2003 – MSC unable to negotiate an equitable price for Shipholdings # 2 T-5 
tanker, Gus W. Darnell. 
 
April 2003 – Operation Iraqi Freedom, the liberation of Iraq by US-led multi-national 
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